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101 
PROP UP THE HEAVENLY CHORUS? LABOR UNIONS, TAX 
POLICY, AND POLITICAL VOICE EQUALITY 
PHILIP T. HACKNEY† 
“The function of democracy has been to provide the public with a second 
power system, which is an alternative power system, which can be used 
to counterbalance the economic power.”  
E.E. Schattschneider 
INTRODUCTION 
Labor unions are weak politically and continue to decline in number 
and political power in the United States.1  Many contend that this is a 
positive development for the country because they believe labor unions 
cause economic harm.2  Others see this loss as unfortunate and harmful  
because the decline of labor comes with a reduction in working class 
benefits and opportunities, and also because it exacerbates economic 
inequality.3  These forces battle over policies focused on the ease of union 
organization and maintenance such as right to work laws and union 
 
† James E. & Betty M. Phillips Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. J.D. 
LSU Law Center, LLM, New York University School of Law. A big thanks to the LSU Law Center for 
a grant making this work possible, and to my research assistant Vivian A. Jeansonne. I also thank 
the participants in the 2016 Junior Tax Law Conference, the participants of the 2016 Critical Tax 
Law Conference, the participants of the 2016 Law & Society Conference, the students and 
faculty at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Advanced Topics in Tax Policy 
Colloquium of Fall 2016, and the students and faculty of University California Irvine School of 
Law Current Issues in Tax Policy and Law Colloquium. I especially thank Alice Abreu, Pippa 
Browde, Neil Buchanan, David Cameron, Adam Chodorow, Charlotte Crane, David Elkins, Lilian 
Faulhaber, Jon Forman, Daniel Hemel, Sarah Lawsky, Francine Lipman, Omri Marian, Goldburn 
Maynard, Philip Postlewaite, Emily Satterthwaite, Erin Scharff, Walter Schwidetsky, and Manoj 
Viswanathan for their thoughts on earlier versions of this paper. 
1 Carl Becker, The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic and Political Consequences, and the 
Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1368, 1641 (2014); PHILIP YALE NICHOLSON, 
LABOR’S STORY IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 9–10 (2004) (anecdotally detailing the declining power of 
unions from 1968–2004); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS 87–94 (2012). 
2 MORGAN O. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER 187–88 (1987); F.A. Hayek, Unions, 
Inflation, and Profits in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 281 (1967). 
3 Jordan Brennan, United States Income Inequality: The Concept of Countervailing Power 
Revisited, 39 J. POST KEYNSIAN ECON. 72, 72–73 (2016). 
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shops.4  While these are important policies for labor union power,5 this 
Article examines labor union tax treatment instead.  The Article focuses 
primarily on whether we should grant exemption from federal income tax 
to these interest groups, but also considers whether labor union members 
should be allowed to deduct labor union dues.  In evaluating these 
questions, this Article focuses on the value of groups in our democracy in 
a social choice function model, rather than on the economic benefits of 
labor unions in a social welfare function model.6  A review of labor union 
tax treatment suggests that we systematically undermine the important 
voice of labor in our democracy.  This Article proposes some changes to  
tax policy related to labor unions as a result of this review. 
In this Article I consider two somewhat divergent income tax policies: 
the tax treatment of labor union income and the deductibility of labor 
union dues.  The first raises the issue of whether we should tax the 
economic activity of a particular legal business entity.  The second raises 
the issue of whether certain individual expenditures should offset income 
for tax purposes.  Both issues raise, as a primary matter, whether the 
expenditures or income represent “real income.”  I argue labor union 
revenue is real income, and that therefore its exemption should be 
justified by some policy goal.7 In other words, there is nothing special 
about the income earned by labor unions that makes it entitled on its face 
to exemption from income tax. Conversely, because labor union member 
dues payments represent an amount that reduces income of the labor 
union member, we should allow the deduction in the ordinary course of 
business unless there is a legitimate reason for not allowing that 
deduction.8 
 
 4 See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY, 20-
21 (1989) (discussing the different possible constructions someone might mean by political 
equality with one focused on maximizing a social welfare function and another primary 
theory focused on maximizing a social choice function). 
5 Patrick Flavin & Michael T. Hartney, When Government Subsidizes Its Own: Collective 
Bargaining Laws as Agents of Political Mobilization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 896, 896 (2015). 
6 See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 20–21 (1989) 
(discussing the different possible constructions someone might mean by political equality, with 
one focused on maximizing a social welfare function, and another primary theory focused on 
maximizing a social choice function). 
 7 Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX 
REV. 101 (2013) (argued all mutual benefit organizations, such as labor unions, should be 
presumed to be taxable unless there is a strong policy reason for subsidizing the activity). 
8 Although labor union dues are generally considered a deductible trade or business 
expense under 26 U.S.C. § 162 of the Code, because labor union members are employees they 
are typically unable to deduct labor union dues either as an above the line deduction under 26 
U.S.C. § 62, or as an itemized deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 67; instead they generally may only 
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In evaluating these two policies, I adopt a social choice function 
model.  Under this model we should maximize the number of individuals 
who have an opportunity to express their voice to influence our 
democracy.  As a very simple incomplete example, if there were 100 
people in a particular democracy and we said that only 25 had the ability 
to influence the final decisions, a policy that increased that number of 
individuals to 30 would improve the social choice function.  The 
incompleteness of the example is the question of the quality of the voice. 
If the new 5 who are now speaking are only reiterating the voice of the 25 
already speaking, then there is no real enhancement to social choice 
function.  In this Article, I struggle to assess when social choice function is 
enhanced by this policy, but do my best to suggest a way through the 
problem with the limited information at our disposal. 
Importantly, the influence at issue in political voice is more than an 
opportunity to vote for representatives; it includes the opportunity to 
engage in policy discussions and influence final decisions on governmental 
policy.  As I will develop in the Article, in a large modern democracy, a 
polyarchy, the primary means of obtaining that voice for most citizens is 
through interest groups.  As an initial matter, the government should be 
hesitant to directly enhance one political interest over another; however, 
because it is in our democratic interest to attempt to alleviate political 
voice inequality, where we can identify a group that suffers from a 
particularly weak political voice we could consider enhancing that political 
voice through public policy. 
When viewed through this model, it is hard to accept that current 
policy regarding the deductibility of union dues is justifiable.  Under the 
tax law, an employee can only deduct unreimbursed business expenses to 
the extent they exceed two percent of her adjusted gross income.  Labor 
union dues are considered unreimbursed employee business expense.  As 
such, labor union memers are rarely able to deduct them. A business 
owner faces no such challenge in deducting his own association dues.9 
These payments of dues directly impact the political voice of a labor union 
member and that of the businessman. We systematically prioritize that of 
the businessmans political voice and undercut the laborer’s.  Given the 
political voice power differential between these two classic interests in 
 
deduct these expenses as miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent those amounts 
exceed two percent of the members adjusted gross income. 
9 Some have objected that this is a much broader problem. We widely make it difficult for 
all employees to deduct unreimbursed employee business expenses. The fact that labor union 
members are unable to deduct their dues is simply a narrow instance of this problem. I argue 
later in the Article that the labor union case is more significant because of its direct impact on 
political voice. In other employee business expense cases, this issue is not close to the fore. 
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favor of the businessmans, it is hard to justify making that power 
differential worse through the tax system. In order to improve the social 
choice function, we should at the least make the two deductions 
equivalent. In order to work towards improving the social choice function 
more, we might even choose to deny the deduction to the businessman 
(and maybe even others with an already substantial political voice), while 
ensuring it to the labor union member.  
Some have objected that the question of the labor union dues 
deduction is a much broader problem.  The claim is that we widely make it 
difficult for employees to deduct unreimbursed employee business 
expenses.  The fact that labor union members are unable to deduct dues is 
simply a narrow instance of this larger issue.  But, the labor union case is 
more significant because of its direct impact on political voice.  In other 
employee business expense cases, this issue is not close to the fore.  
The case of tax exemption for labor unions is more complex.  It 
depends on other policy choices made.  For instance, if other interest 
groups are provided tax exemption—the status quo right now—then the 
case for labor union tax exemption is overwhelming.  It is only fair to 
extend the exemption to labor interests if business interests benefit from 
the policy. Denying labor exemption would decrease the social choice 
function by reducing the voice of labor in a relative sense compared to 
other political voices that the policy would enhance, such as that of 
business.  
 However, if we compare exemption for all interest groups to a policy 
state where all interests are taxed, we may find  that labor interests are 
better off under the latter state.  The problem of collective action makes it 
more difficult for large, relatively poor, and less skilled interests like labor 
to form, as compared to smaller, wealthier, more skilled interests, like 
those that form in the business context.  In other words, exemption as a 
benefit is much more likely to be of assistance to business interests in any 
case than labor interests.  Many business interests are simply getting a 
windfall from this exemption from tax.  Taxation is likely to be more of a 
hindrance to the better capitalized business interests.  Based on this, I 
argue the social choice function would be increased under this taxable 
state because labor interests, as a relative matter, would not experience 
the same type of reduction in voice as would other more powerful 
interests who would now have to pay tax on income.   
Finally, the collective action challenge of labor in theory and practice 
is so severe that a policy of tax exemption for labor interests alone could 
be justified as a modest attempt at righting political voice equality in our 
democracy. In a social choice function sense, providing a subsidy to labor 
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interests, while not providing the subsidy to others like business interests 
could bring more voices into the political debate. However, as will be 
developed below, the case for this is not strong.  The policy instrument 
provides meager support and is not well-tailored to accomplish this 
purpose. 
Our current tax-exemption system10 generally allows any group that 
wants to form a non-profit organization to form and obtain tax-exempt 
status.11  For instance, Congress exempts many special interests from 
federal income tax, such as trade associations, social welfare 
organizations, and labor unions.12  No one has offered a strong theory 
supporting this policy to subsidize groups that work to influence our 
political system.  Given the attempts we make to limit the ability of 
interest groups to influence our elections and policy generally,13 this 
choice is odd.  While providing charitable organizations a subsidy can be 
justified in part on the fact that they provide public benefits, labor unions 
are little involved in provision of direct public benefits.  As mutual benefit 
organizations, they look to advance their members’ interests through 
negotiating with management and seeking their wants through the 
political process. 
To evaluate the idea of tax exemption generally as it applies to labor 
unions, I consider the major non-profit tax-exemption rationales.  I find 
them important, but unsatisfactory, because they all fail to consider the 
important value of political voice equality.  Market-failure theory suggests 
we should subsidize organizations that offer goods or services subject to 
market failure.14  While we can show a market failure in the case of labor 
interests generally, the theory fails to tell us what type of market failure is 
necessary to justify the subsidy.  Government failure theory suggests we 
allow nonprofits to provide collective goods and services that the 
government fails to provide.15  This theory focuses on goods and services 
that are not critical to the functioning and decision making of the 
 
10 26 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2014). 
11 There are limits of course. A particular company cannot form a business league to 
support its own product. It must instead form to support a line of business. None of the tax-
exempt interest group organizations can engage primarily in political campaign activity. 
12 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(4)–(6) (West 2014). These are respectively social welfare 
organizations, labor organizations, and trade associations. Although the Code refers to labor 
unions as labor organizations, I will refer to “labor unions” in the rest of the paper. 
13 ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 2–6 (2005). 
14 Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate 
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67–70 (1981) (most clearly articulating contract failure theory). 
15 Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector 
Economy, 21 in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986) (most 
clearly articulating government failure theory). 
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government itself.  Interest groups however are fundamental to the 
government structure itself.  Government failure theory fails to consider 
whether there might be a different quality and importance to such 
services.  Pluralism theory considers the deeply political nature of much of 
our nonprofit tax exempt sector; it contends that we should exempt 
nonprofit organizations from tax to facilitate democracy.  The central idea 
of this theory is the more political voices we highlight, the better off our 
democracy.  The theory, however, fails to consider that many nonprofit 
interests face little to no collective action problem.  Those organizations 
with greater wealth and skill are likely to face less of a collective action 
problem and also more likely to draw a greater return from the subsidy.  
Thus, the subsidy will work to enhance the voice of those already strong.  
This enhancement is likely to work to drown out weaker voices. 
There are many theoretical or functional lenses through which we 
could view these nonprofit organizations.  We could look at the impact 
they might have on our economy in a functional sense such as how the 
presence of labor unions impact the distribution of resources.  We could 
then assess in a theoretical sense whether the presence of labor unions 
results in a more fair distribution of resources.  However, I contend that 
viewing them through a functional lens, such as viewing them in their 
interest group role, and through a theoretical lens, such as the governance 
role they play in our democracy, provides the most significant and 
important insights to our tax policy. 
I have previously examined tax-exempt business leagues through the 
lens of interest group literature.16  An interest group is “a collection of 
individuals or a group of individuals linked together by professional 
circumstance, or by common political, economic, or social interests” that 
satisfies three requirements: (1) the organization is not a political party, 
that is, the name of the organization does not appear on a ballot; (2) it 
uses some of its resources to try to influence legislative, judicial, or 
executive decisions at any level of government; and (3) it is organized 
outside of the government it intends to influence.17  Viewed as an interest 
group primarily, we can see that business leagues do not face significant 
collective action problems and cannot be shown to face some other 
significant market failure to warrant tax exemption.18  Just as a matter of 
 
16 Philip T. Hackney, Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus: Why Section 501(c)(6) Trade 
Associations are Undeserving of Tax Exemption, 92 DEN. U. L. REV. 265, 269 (2015) (hereinafter 
Taxing the Unheavenly). 
17 JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 
22–23 (1996) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
18 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16. 
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its place in the marketplace, there is no indication that there is any 
general lack of business interest groups. 
Labor interests are also interest groups, but they present a different 
case.  Theory suggests a large, latent interest like that of labor should 
experience high difficulty in organizing to provide the collective goods of 
representation before government and bargaining with employers.19  
Evidence shows that labor is highly underrepresented politically.  In a 
study from 2001, labor made up only 1% of the interest group sector.20  
That was compared to business nonprofit interest representation of 20 
percent and business corporations at 35 percent.  There is, thus, evidence 
that a severe market failure hinders labor from representing itself in the 
market and before government in a comparative sense.  This suggests that 
current tax exemption policy generally has it backwards.  Instead of 
providing every group exemption we should tailor exemption only to 
those groups that really need the assistance.  Additionally, generally 
denying labor union members the ability to deduct union dues is likely to 
directly harm political voice equality where business interests so readily 
have access to that deduction.21 
This Article contributes to the tax legal literature by providing an 
analysis of labor unions and how we tax them.  Although labor unions as a 
whole are a very small part of our economy and tax system, by looking at 
one narrow section of the tax-exempt sector we can shed light on the rest 
of the exempt sector.  Additionally, although most tax policy scholarship 
focuses on one of three values—equity in an economic sense, efficiency in 
an economic sense, and administrability—I focus primarily on the value of 
equity in a governance sense.   
I argue that at least in the sphere of tax where tax choices directly 
impact our democracy, we should take into consideration values of 
 
19 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 57–59 (20th prtg. 2002) (hereinafter 
COLLECTIVE ACTION). 
20 KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS 321 tbl.11.3 (2012). 
21 When looking at a tax subsidy, it is important to consider whether the person who is 
named as the beneficiary of the deduction will be incentivized by that deduction. That question 
is the question of who receives the incidence of the subsidy. That question depends on the 
elasticity of a union member to paying union dues. Given the substantial challenge in organizing 
unions, it seems likely that, at least as an initial matter without the consideration of any other 
laws, labor union members are highly elastic as to whether they will pay union dues or not. Their 
return is unclear and is often unlikely to exceed the annual cost. Where there is a union shop, 
however, that requires union members to pay union dues whether they want to belong or not, 
the answer is obviously different. Nevertheless, the primary other party that might receive the 
incidence of the money gained through the deduction would be the union itself, meaning that 
the question of who gains the incidence of the deduction does not matter if all we care about is 
whether the policy would increase union activity or not. 
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democracy.  In that sphere, we should not adopt tax policies that increase 
political voice inequality.  Also, it is reasonable to adopt tax policies that 
increase the equality of political voice.  Because I find that our current 
taxing system of interest groups broadly increases political voice 
inequality, I find our tax system wanting and make recommendations for 
change. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I covers the tax treatment of 
labor interests.  Part II begins to build a social choice function model by 
sketching the case for democracy and thereby political equality.  Part III 
completes the social choice function model by highlighting the role of 
groups such as labor unions within a democracy and evaluates the role 
groups play in the matter of political equality.  Part IV describes the 
history and tax law of labor unions.  Some who are unfamiliar with the tax-
exemption requirements of labor unions might want to jump to Part IV.B 
for a discussion of that area of the law first.  Part V assesses theories 
regarding the rationale for exempting nonprofit organizations.  Part VI 
analyzes the implications of democratic group theory for the tax 
treatment of labor interests.  Part VII concludes. 
I. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TAX TREATMENT OF LABOR INTERESTS 
This Part looks at the technical tax treatment of labor union income 
and the payment by members of labor union dues.  There are three 
primary types of labor union income: (1) member income, (2) nonmember 
income, and (3) investment income.22  An initial question is whether the 
“income” exempted is “real income” that should in the ordinary course of 
an income tax be taxed.  Because there appears to be a real transaction in 
a commercial space between individuals and a legal entity to acquire 
services or goods from that entity, the income exempted seems to be real 
income that would ordinarily be taxed in our economy; any decision to 
exempt that income should supported by a policy intended to incentivize 
this activity.  Labor union dues will be considered at the end of this Part. 
(1) Member Income.  Labor union members pay member dues to the 
union.  Those dues entitle members to certain rights and benefits that 
have a value.23  For instance, in exchange for the dues, the union might 
engage in collective bargaining on behalf of the employees and might also 
defend an employee who has a dispute with management.  In effect, the 
labor union provides services to its members in exchange for a fee just the 
 
22 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 268. 
23 Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from 
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 354 (1976) 
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way a health club provides services to its members in exchange for a fee.  
Assuming that the labor union is a separate legal entity from its members, 
this transaction should result in income to the labor union for the 
purposes of the income tax. 
United States tax law treats a corporation as a legal entity that is 
separate and apart from its members.24  Under that theory, when a 
member pays dues to a union in exchange for certain goods and services 
he is dealing with a legal entity that is separate from himself.  Generally, 
our income tax law has treated such a moment as a moment to recognize 
income for tax purposes.25  However, some do not accept member dues as 
income of the nonprofit.26  They argue that the nonprofit corporation is no 
more than a place where nonprofit members are pooling income to do 
things nonprofit members could do on their own.  The idea is that 
neighbors A, B, and C could pool money to construct a tennis court.  A, B, 
and C would then each pay the costs of maintaining the court.  We should 
not suddenly tax A, B, and C as an entity simply because they are carrying 
on activity together.  Utilizing this characterization to describe a large 
complex organization like a union that is an interest group delivering 
collective benefits seems questionable.  The key aspect of interest groups 
is that they form because no member could provide these collective goods 
and services on his own.  The entity and collective action of members 
joined together is necessary for its power.  There is a real difference 
between the member and the organization. 
In any case, not all member income is easily placed into the pooling 
income basket, even if you accept the pooling income argument.  Where a 
union sells goods or services that are not core goods or services of the 
union, we might think of this income differently.  Thus, where a union sells 
education, or insurance, or death benefits to its members, we might think 
 
24 Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). 
25 However, there is a real question as to why we would apply a tax to a corporate entity. A 
corporate entity is a legal fiction, after all. I take a look at that question in: Philip T. Hackney, 
What we Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 101 (2013). There I 
argue that the two best theories are the shareholder theory that holds we tax corporations to 
tax the shareholders, and the real entity theory that suggests the corporation is a thing that has 
power that can be regulated through taxation. Both of these theories could arguably apply to a 
labor union, making it a good subject of taxation. 
26 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations 
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 343 (1976) (discussing the idea that we might 
view church congregations as only pooling resources rather than selling services); David S. 
Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 652 TAX F. 1, 2 n. 5 
(2013) (discussing that legislators adopted the tax exemption scheme for social clubs in order to 
not impose harmful tax consequences on those who choose to pool their resources together to 
engage in recreation); Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 
134 (2006). 
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of it differently than when it sells collective-bargaining with an employer.  
In the end, unions sell services that differ little from normal business 
activity that we apply the income tax to in most other situations.  
Members pay dues to acquire collective bargaining with an employer, 
magazine subscriptions, management grievance protection, and some 
lobbying and political activity.  It is worth justifying why we would diverge 
in income tax treatment for this type of financial arrangement. 
(2) Nonmember Income.  A union generates nonmember income 
when an individual who is not considered to be a member pays the union 
for goods or services.27  For instance, some unions sell health insurance to 
those who are not members of the union.  This type of sale results in non-
member income to the union.  The union realizes income to the extent the 
amount paid exceeds the costs of that good or service.  Most theorists 
consider this income as income that should be taxed in a normal income 
tax system.  Exemption of this income is effectively a subsidy to the union 
to the extent we do not tax it.  With other mutual benefit nonprofits, 
social clubs for instance, Congress rightly taxes such nonmember 
income.28 
(3)  Investment Income.  Investment income is the return from stocks 
and bonds or other capital investments.29  Most theorists also accept the 
exemption of this income as a subsidy to a nonprofit organization.  An 
individual cannot generally invest income and avoid the income tax on the 
return from that investment.  In effect, allowing tax exemption for a 
particular purpose allows the creation of a communal tax-free investment 
vehicle for that purpose in the same way we allow individuals to establish 
tax-free savings vehicles for retirement or education for their children. 
Impact of Tax Exemption.  The regime of tax-exemption encourages a 
nonprofit to hold earnings beyond a taxable period.  This is because tax-
exemption only provides a subsidy to the extent there are earnings and 
those earnings are not immediately spent within a particular taxable year. 
Additionally, exemption provides primarily a benefit of the deferral of tax 
rather than permanently exempting income from tax.  Union dues are 
technically deductible unless they are used for lobbying or political 
activity.  To the extent that the union holds money from one year to the 
next, the main issue would be that the member got to deduct the amount 
early.  Of course, this does not take into consideration the different tax 
rates involved between union members and the corporation, or different 
tax rates over time, or the fact that union members change over time. 
 
27 See Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 136. 
28 26 U.S.C.A. § 513 (West 2014). 
29 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 293. 
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If a union were taxable, it could avoid tax, or at least lower its taxable 
income, by ensuring revenues and expenses closely match.  This may be 
difficult for a union because they typically act in part as an insurance 
service to the extent they hold strike funds or provide other insurance-like 
benefits to members.  Additionally, any organization that is looking for 
stability values maintaining some savings.  Thus, many unions would likely 
hold some percentage of profits into a future year.   
Taxation of Union Dues.  A union member’s payment of dues is 
generally a deductible business expense.30  However, most union 
members are unable to deduct this amount.  Union dues are a 
miscellaneous itemized deduction.31  Such a deduction can only be 
deducted to the extent all similar deductions exceed two percent of the 
individual’s adjusted gross income.  For instance, a union member with 
$60,000 in adjusted gross income can only deduct union dues along with 
other miscellaneous items to the extent all of those items exceed $1,200.  
If that union member pays $400 in union dues, but incurs no other 
miscellaneous itemized deduction, he will not be able to deduct the 
amount.  Even if the union member gets past this hurdle in part, the 
standard deduction is likely greater than the union member’s total 
itemized deductions, meaning, again, that the union member will not be 
able to deduct this business expense. 
The comparison to the businessman’s trade union dues is important. 
As a business expense those dues are deductible immediately from gross 
income above the line. There is no itemizing for the businessman. His 
income is most instances reduces his gross income. 
It is quite possible that because union members generally cannot 
deduct their union dues that labor interests are overtaxed rather than 
undertaxed.  I will return to this point in Part VI when I analyze the case 
for how to tax labor interests. 
II. DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF GROUPS THEREIN 
Most normative income tax scholarship focuses upon either an 
economic efficiency or economic fairness dimension to model an ideal 
system or to critique the current one.  It asks whether a tax system is the 
most economically efficient or the most economically fair to different 
groups and classes of people.  Nevertheless, in this Article, I primarily 
critique our tax system on the dimension of democracy and political voice 
 
30 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (2000). However, dues used for lobbying or political campaign activity 
are not deductible under § 162(e). 
31 26 U.S.C.A. § 67 (2000). 
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equality.  On economic fairness, many utilize an entitlement or welfarist 
model to assess policy.32  On economic efficiency, scholars often use the 
Pareto (or Kaldor-Hicks) efficiency of a competitive market as a model to 
assess policy.33  We lack a model to assess political fairness in a 
democratic system.34  This Part, thus, sketches a model of an ideal 
democratic system and the role that political voice equality plays within 
that system. 
Many elements of our tax system directly impact our democracy.  
The choice to adopt a progressive tax, the choice to impose an estate tax, 
the choice to apply a corporate tax, and the choice to exempt some 
organizations from that tax all impact our democratic system by impacting 
the political voice of various citizens and entities.  Thus, it is worthwhile to 
consider the tax systems impact on our democracy even in one small part 
of the system in order to evaluate the income tax’s impact on democracy 
more broadly. 
Should political voice equality be the sole or primary driver of income 
tax policy?  No.  Imposing confiscatory taxes to try to ensure perfect 
political voice equality is likely both problematic from an efficiency 
standpoint and American norms of fairness.  While striving towards 
democracy is critical to a fair society, there are other important factors 
critical to assessing a tax system including its economic fairness and 
efficiency.  The democracy-enhancing nature of a policy is only one factor 
in analyzing a tax system.  In the case of tax exemption, though, it is a 
particularly important factor, and maybe even the defining factor. 
This first part sketches the necessary conditions of democracy, 
discusses why democracy, and focuses closely on the element of political 
equality.35  A model of an ideal democracy allows us to critique its current 
form in the United States and to assess whether our choices of taxation 
impact our democracy in a positive or negative way.  Finally, it examines 
 
32 Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look 
at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1915 (1987). 
33 Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 62 (1996). 
34 See, e.g., David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market 
Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 80 (2011) (discussing the lack of a baseline to 
assess a neutral political system); David Lowery et. al., Images of an Unbiased Interest System, 
22 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 1212, 1212–13 (2015) (discussing that individual participation can be 
modeled on one-person one-vote, but that a pluralist group system lacks any coherent baseline 
upon which to judge whether it is unbiased). 
35 In sketching this account of democracy, I rely heavily upon the work of Robert Dahl. In 
particular, I rely upon: ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON 
DEMOCRACY (2nd ed. 2015) [hereinafter ON DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2nd ed. 2003); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY (2006) [hereinafter 
ON POLITICAL EQUALITY]. 
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the role groups play within that system.  Some might question the need to 
detail why democracy. However, many have different conceptions of what 
democracy might mean and this effort will help clarify the terms of 
democracy. Additionally, some do not really believe in democracy after all.  
The Founders themselves, for instance, were highly distrustful of 
unfettered democracy and designed a system to combat against a 
majority taking complete control.  Someone who does not believe 
democracy to be the right form of government may also not accept the 
conclusions of this Article. 
A. How and Why Democracy? 
The fundamental question in considering politics is how the group is 
going to decide what to do.  In other words, who gets to determine what 
is in the best interest of the group, the association, the state? The simplest 
and most direct answer to this question is: “[a]mong adults no persons are 
so definitely better qualified than others to govern that they should be 
entrusted with complete and final authority over the government of the 
state.”36  To put it more positively, we can make the moral judgment that 
all people are of equal, intrinsic worth and, therefore, ought to have an 
equal say in deciding what the group is going to do.  Professor Robert Dahl 
refers to this as the principle of “intrinsic equality.”37  Once you accept this 
moral judgment about individuals, there are a series of principles that lead 
you to some form of democratic government.  Democracy is an imperfect 
system of government that is littered with contradictions; and yet, if you 
accept the basic principal of intrinsic equality, democracy appears to be 
the best choice. 
What are the ideal requirements for a democracy?  A democracy 
must allow all individuals an opportunity to participate in discussing 
options before a decision is final.38  That opportunity must be equal and 
real.  All individuals in the democracy must have an equal vote in any final 
decision.39  All the members must have an equal and real opportunity to 
examine and understand both the policy being considered for a vote and 
all reasonable alternatives.40  That understanding should include an 
appreciation of the consequences of the decisions.  Similarly, all members 
must be involved in setting the agenda of the association.41  Finally, all 
 
36 ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 35, at 4. 
37 ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 35, at 4. 
38 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 37. 
39 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 37. 
40 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 37. 
41 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 37. 
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competent individuals in the association, which generally means all adults, 
must have these rights.42  To the extent any of these requirements are 
missing, political equality will be lacking.43   
To highlight what this means it is useful to consider the two primary 
alternatives to democracy—anarchism and guardianship.44  A theorist who 
falls into either of these camps is much less likely to be persuaded by the 
arguments in this Article, because the argument depends largely on an 
acceptance of the principles of democracy.  They may still support the 
case in part because many of the principles are similar. 
In a highly simplistic sense, an anarchist wants to maximize human 
freedom and he believes that a state is the primary inhibitor of human 
freedom.45  The fundamental principle of anarchism is that state coercion 
is evil.46  Thus, even if a state employs a democratic process to make rules 
and to enforce those rules, the anarchist will find that state illegitimate 
because it also uses coercion.  The anarchist believes the state should be 
run by voluntary organizations instead of through a democratic process.47  
Thus, an association or state following anarchist principles that wants to 
follow some form of democracy needs complete unanimity to take action. 
The anarchist powerfully criticizes democracy by pointing to the harm 
of minority coercion.  This is a problem for the democratic theorist 
because he does not believe it right for someone else to make choices for 
another. Like the anarchist, he believes that coercion is wrong.  Thus, the 
anarchist critique puts the democratic theorist in a bind.  In a democracy, 
the majority makes the choice for a demos and thereby coerces a 
minority.48  The anarchist critique calls into question whether majority rule 
is just.  So, how does democracy withstand this critique?  The answer is 
twofold. First, the democratic theorist notes that anarchy is impractical 
and maybe impossible. Second, he accepts that the coercion of the 
 
42 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 38. 
43 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 38. 
44 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 37. 
45 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 37. Anarchism is a very loosely held together 
system of thought. For a decent discussion of it as both a theory and a movement, see April 
Carter, The Political Theory of Anarchism (1971) (in particular see Chapter 2, Anarchism and the 
State) http://www.ditext.com/carter/anarchism.html  
46 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 37. 
47 An anarchist would presumably fully support tax exemption for any nonprofit 
organization and would likely try to get as many aspects of our economy into that sector as 
possible, in order to erase as much of the state as possible. A libertarian would likewise be 
highly supportive of robust tax exemption for nonprofits. In both instances, though, they would 
expect those entities to be completely voluntary. 
48 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 37. 
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minority is problematic but argues that the democratic system, among 
governmental systems, results in the least amount of coercion. 
There are significant problems to the practicality of the anarchist 
case. A key belief of the anarchist is that humans can successfully work 
together solely through voluntary organizations. They believe it is possible 
to operate a complex society with absolutely no coercion.  However, there 
are no credible examples of such a government succeeding.49  
Additionally, there are two theoretical problems with the anarchist 
solution.  First, anarchists must believe that without a state there would 
be no coercion.50  If they are right, then they have a good case; but, based 
on almost all written history, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
coercion is ubiquitous among humanity.  In a society without a state, the 
strong will almost certainly take advantage of the weak.  If it can be shown 
that you are likely to have less coercion via a democratic state, then the 
anarchist argument under a utilitarian analysis should fail even under 
anarchist theory.  Second, most anarchist approaches depend upon some 
form of coercion to overthrow the original state.51  Thus, even anarchists 
accept the coercion of others to get to a better moral situation. 
The democratic theorist uses the anarchist’s acceptance of coercion 
to support democracy.  If coercion is acceptable to get to a better state, 
presumably coercion might be just if it could be shown that this particular 
coercion allowed a state to maintain the least amount of coercion.  The 
democratic theorist argues we achieve the least amount of coercion in a 
state where a majority controls the decisions of the state, and we also 
maximize the social choice function.52  Perhaps the most potent critique 
though remains that unless an anarchist’s utopian vision of a society 
without coercion can exist, the anarchist vision is simply unworkable. 
Guardianship, unlike anarchism, is a practical alternative to 
democracy.  Plato most famously proposed this form of government in 
The Republic.53  There he argued that we should establish a society that 
trains a class of people who are exceptional individuals in that they are 
both wise at governing and able to put the interests of the public ahead of 
their own interests.  B.F. Skinner also, in a more modern sense, made a 
case for governance by psychologists.54  A guardianship theorist holds two 
primary beliefs: (1) most people are incapable of governing, and (2) 
 
 49 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 46. 
 50 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 46. 
 51 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 46. 
 52 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 45. 
53 See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC. 
54 See generally B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (2007). 
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society can locate and train a small group of highly governance-capable 
people.55  Guardianship thrives because many instinctively believe there is 
some class of people that is qualified to govern, and conversely, that most 
people are not capable of governing. 
The guardianship theorist finds no problem supporting the first 
proposition.  Any review of the voting records of citizens, their 
competence regarding basic civic facts, and their lack of an ability to think 
of more than their own self-interests makes a pretty powerful statement 
regarding limited ability of most people to govern.56  It is the second 
proposition that is problematic.  Proponents of guardianship must be able 
to also make the case that there are individuals who we can identify and 
properly train to wisely rule.  The proponent argues that because we 
already pick individuals to perform highly complex tasks there is no reason 
we cannot do the same for the task of governing.57  For instance, we 
identify and train physicians to perform tasks that are very difficult and 
subject to matters of life and death.  There is no reason to believe we 
could not do the same for our rulers argues the guardianship theorist.58  
However, to make the positive case, we must be able to find this small 
minority of individuals with the moral, instrumental, and practical 
knowledge to govern, and these special people must be able to genuinely 
put the public ahead of themselves.  This seems highly implausible. 
If we reject guardianship as impractical or impossible, can we justify 
the principle of intrinsic equality?  It is the building block of the 
democratic idea.  It justifies the ability for us to accept that all adults in 
the group are capable of governance.  The formation of the United States 
as a democracy of course relied upon this principle in the Declaration of 
Independence.  But as suggested above by those who advocate 
guardianship, it is by no means self-evident that all people are created 
equal.  We all differ in ability both intellectually and physically.  These 
differences might allow someone to reasonably conclude that there are 
individuals who should govern because they have particularly strong 
capabilities in that regard. 
Nevertheless, there are still good reasons to accept the intrinsic 
equality principle.  First, almost all religious traditions and ethical 
 
55 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 59. 
56 See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER (2008) (making the case that 
most Americans are so ignorant of economic policy that they are not capable of governing on 
matters of economics); cf. MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE 13 (2014) (arguing that 
although the governing capabilities of most Americans are very low, they have enough capacity 
to govern themselves). 
57 Democracy AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 62. 
58 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 62–63. 
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traditions operate on this principle.59  Second as explored in part when 
considering guardianship, all other principles are weaker.60  Those who are 
in the glorified category of superior are almost certainly convinced they 
are correct, but the others who are not considered superior are likely to 
disagree.  Third, the principle is supported by prudence.61  It is the 
principle that best ensures we are treated as fair as possible.  Finally, 
although perhaps guilty of circular reasoning, the principle is likely to be 
acceptable to more total people than any other.62  Again, the principle 
maximizes the social choice function. 
The principle of intrinsic equality leads to a conclusion that political 
equality or political voice equality are necessary to any just political 
system.  Dahl labels this value “inclusion.”63  Political voice equality means 
everyone in the group must have the opportunity to discuss potential 
policies, set the agenda, and vote on final decisions.  John Stuart Mill 
spoke clearly on this point within a representative governmental context 
when he chastised the British government for failing to include the 
workingman in the decision-making.  Mill said:  
[D]oes Parliament, or almost any of the other members composing it, 
ever for an instant look at any question with the eye of the working 
man? When a subject arises in which the laborers as such have an 
interest, is it regarded from any point of view but that of employers of 
labor?64 
This critique still has powerful resonance today as we will see when we 
review what the political voice of labor looks like today in the United 
States. 
Beyond the principle of intrinsic equality, the other fundamental 
matter to democracy is the decisionmaking process. A democracy 
operates based on majority rule to maximize possible political equality in 
final decisions.  In a utilitarian sense, the procedural rule of decision-
making based on majority rule should insure that the greatest number of 
people get their way on a particular policy.  The rule should maximize the 
amount of freedom of the individuals of an association or state to govern 
themselves.  That is simple enough. However, the challenge is what to do 
if the majority adopts a rule that hinders some of the identified necessary 
elements of a democracy? 
 
59 ON DEMOCRACY, at 66. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (expanded ed. 2005). 
60 ON DEMOCRACY, at 66. 
61 ON DEMOCRACY, at 67. 
62 ON DEMOCRACY, at 67. 
63 ON DEMOCRACY, at 76. 
64 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861). 
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Once a final decision is made by majority rule, there will be some 
who did not get their choice.  This of course is fine.  But, if the majority 
eliminates a fundamental right (or rights) of a democracy then we no 
longer have a democracy.  The typical solutions to this problem is that we 
either develop a populace that respects the norms of democracy, or we 
establish an undemocratic means of enforcing fundamental rights—a 
Supreme Court, for example.65  The other challenging but integrally 
related question, considered in the next Section below, is how to 
operationalize the ideal democratic principles into a modern, large state?  
This, after all, is what we have in the United States and is the more 
relevant issue for considering the place of a labor union in our democracy. 
B. Application of Ideal Democracy to the Large Modern State—the 
Problem with Groups 
Ideal democratic theory is utopian in nature.  Once a group is too 
large, it is impractical to achieve ideal democratic conditions.  Providing a 
real opportunity to speak, consider and decide to ten people is a much 
different proposition than providing such rights to one thousand people 
much less one millon people.  In a large state, political voice equality 
simply becomes impossible.  A number of factors lead to this problem: (1) 
differing abilities and resources; (2) scarcity of time for individuals; (3) 
numerosity; (4) the fact that the market impacts so many decisions; (5) 
the existence of international systems that impact our democratic choices; 
and (6) the reality that crises will occur.66  Each of these factors mean that 
certain individuals or organizations with greater skill, greater money, and 
greater time will have more time to influence the agenda, the information, 
and the final decision of a large state.  It means that we will likely stray far 
from the ideals of democracy we have already identified.  We will lack 
political equality among citizens. 
Nevertheless, ideal democratic theory provides a model for large 
democratic states to measure their success and to aim to develop 
institutions that mimic the goals of the ideal democratic state.  In order to 
achieve something close to democracy, large, modern democratic states, 
or polyarchies,67: (1) elect representatives of the people; (2) conduct 
elections regularly with fairness and without coercion; (3) guarantee 
freedom of speech particularly on matters of criticizing the political 
system; (4) provide robust “[a]ccess to alternative sources of information” 
 
65 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, at 155, 173. 
66 ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, at 50–51. 
67 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, at 117. 
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outside of the governmental regime; (5) allow associations, including 
political parties and interest groups, to form with ease; and (6) allow all 
adults to fully participate in all of the five freedoms listed above.68 
These institutions, in one sense, seem self-evident.  Because there is 
no way to operate a pure democracy in a polyarchy, electing 
representatives becomes the only functional way for the society to govern 
itself.  To obtain accountability of representatives, a polyarchy must adopt 
frequent elections.69  Perhaps, most critically, freedom of speech, 
information, and association become the foundation of democracy.  These 
measures ensure all of society has at least an opportunity to participate in 
information-gathering and agenda-setting.  While citizens will not 
generally get a say in final decisions made by their representatives, at 
least they are never shut out of the discussion if these institutions are 
maintained. 
However, do these five fundamental rights identified above ensure 
political equality necessary in ideal democratic theory?  No.  While 
implicitly found throughout those rights, none of those rights mandates a 
right to political equality.  Because of the large size of the demos and the 
number and complexity of issues before the demos, most citizens will 
have no opportunity to participate in understanding the issues before the 
demos or in developing the information about alternative policies.  Any 
citizen who is not a representative gets no vote on final decisions of the 
demos and most citizens will have only limited opportunity to participate 
in the decision-making process.  Political equality in its ideal sense simply 
cannot exist in a polyarchy. 
In the same way that a polyarchy utilizes representatives to make 
final decisions, a natural solution to part of the political equality problem 
in a polyarchy is to rely on groups of individuals with political interests to 
speak on behalf of citizens to equalize citizen voices—that is, interest 
groups.  This might be better thought of as political voice equality.  The 
pluralists in the 1940s and 1950s argued that interest groups solved the 
problem of political voice equality.  In the pluralist view, interest groups 
form for every possible citizen interest and express the voice of those 
many interests to representatives.70  Are they right? 
While the pluralists present a relatively positive vision of group 
activity in a democracy, there is a distinctly negative vision of interest 
groups in American thought.  Many say that the problem with the 
 
68 ON DEMOCRACY, at 85–86. 
69 ON DEMOCRACY, at 95–96. 
70 Cf. ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 207 (1982) (denying any pluralist 
actually ever held this facile of a notion of pluralist theory). 
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governance of the United States is those interest groups that the pluralist 
glorifies are instead “special interests” that harm democratic equality.  In 
this vision, special interests push citizens to the side and control our 
government.  They cause harm to our democratic system by moving policy 
toward primarily wealthy interests rather than toward some common 
public interest.71  Professor Jeffery Berry says “there is a widespread 
popular perception that interest groups are a cancer spreading unchecked 
throughout the body politic.”72  The sense is that these special interests 
pervert the will of the people and replace it with the will of the wealthy, 
the elite, and the well-connected. 
Group activity presents a challenge to a democracy.  Each group may 
represent a common interest as to its members, but the group will 
present a selfish interest as to the demos.  This group activity then 
destroys the ancient political goal of government seeking some common 
public good.  In a polyarchy, it is rare that we can find a common good.  
This is the pluralist problem in a polyarchy.  The principles of democracy 
require even greater suffrage, and yet as those additional members come 
into the demos the irreconcilable conflicts become ubiquitous.  The 
democracy becomes a battle of groups for power rather than a collective 
of people searching for a path to the common good. 
In Federalist 10, James Madison warned of the dangers of factions 
that he defined as groups of citizens organized to promote some common 
interest that is adverse to the rights of other citizens or the common good 
of the polity.73  Madison believed a minority faction was not to be feared 
because the majority could ensure through the simple power of 
numerosity that the minority could not control.74  He feared that a 
majority faction threatened the public good and the rights of citizens,75 
and therefore thought pure democracy was susceptible to tyrannical 
 
71 JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 16 (2009). 
72 Id. 
73 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison). This point is important. Madison believed 
that there could be a single common will or public interest. Today, most doubt the idea that a 
singular public interest exists. In a polyarchy, there is a vast diversity of opinion as to the right 
direction for the polity to take. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 160 (expanded 
ed. 2006) [hereinafter A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY]. 
74 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 73, at 51. 
75 Although Madison was involved in forming our democratic constitution, he seemed a 
proponent of guardianship. He genuinely believed there were some better suited to govern than 
others, and thought that a Republic was the best way to go about identifying those individuals. A 
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 73, at 159. Madison was primarily concerned, as were 
many of his generation, and prior governmental theorists, with the masses taking away property 
rights. Id. at 161. 
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abuse by a majority.76  Madison recognized,77 in a large country, some 
form of associational pluralism is necessary to governance.78  He believed 
that these factions could be controlled by forming a large republic with 
elected representatives of the people.79  The large republic and 
representatives, in this view, would work to disperse the power of a 
majority faction.80 
Perhaps accounting for some of the difference in the positive or 
negative view of groups or factions in a democracy between the pluralist 
and this Madisonian vision is that Madison seems to have built his political 
theory on the assumption that a government should work to try to 
accomplish a singular common good.81  In the pluralist vision, there is no 
such thing as a common good for a demos.  The pluralist maintains that 
we should allow a diversity of groups to seek their interests through 
government.82  Rather than interest groups being the problem of 
polyarchy to solve, interest groups are the solution to the challenge of 
allowing all citizens’ voices to be heard.  The common good is found in the 
process of democracy, rather than in the results.  In other words, the 
focus is on a social choice function, rather than a social welfare function. 
Whether there is a common good or not, there are still real problems 
with the pluralist vision and solution.  Pluralist scholars, Arthur Bentley 
and David Truman, in their early writings, seemed to suggest that any 
interest that wanted to form a group could in fact form that group.83  An 
interest is a collection of individuals that holds an interest in the 
governmental provision of some good, service, or policy.  Those citizens 
may hold that interest and never form a group.  Or, they may hold that 
interest and organize into a group.  That organization may be formalized 
legally, or it might stay relatively unorganized.  In the simple version of 
pluralism, all interests face the same challenge in formation.  Truman 
 
76 When making this claim, he likely thought of groups like Shays’ Rebellion. DAVID TRUMAN, 
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 4 (Knopf ed. 1951). 
77 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 73, at 51 (“The latent causes of faction are thus sown in 
the nature of man.”). 
78 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 299. See also UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 
1, at 270–71. 
79 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 73, at 51. 
80 Id. 
81 A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY at 160. 
82 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 295. 
83 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 276. See Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 
274–78 (discussing the pluralist vision); see also E. PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION 
BEFORE CONGRESS 22 (Johns Hopkins Press ed. 1929) (“Not only are almost all sorts of interests 
and classes represented but also all sides of most questions as well.”). 
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described interest formation and mobilization like waves.84  One group, 
like veterans, might organize to successfully seek pension benefits from 
the federal government.  Postal workers might see that and organize to 
generate similar benefits, and private employees might seek such benefits 
too.  Employers might then organize to offset these new benefits.  And so 
it goes.  Since that early work, many have identified significant problems 
with the claim. 
E.E. Schattshneider stated that “[t]he flaw in the pluralist heaven is 
that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”85  What 
he means is that when we look at the groups that organize and operate in 
our democracy, we find that those groups overwhelmingly represent 
wealthy interests.  This is the collective action problem:  Some interests, 
such as the wealthy, are far more likely to organize and are far more likely 
to be heard than the unorganized.  Additionally, there is no way to ensure 
equality of political voice when citizen voices come through different size 
and power groups.86  We will always come up short on democracy when 
we operate through groups.  The problems do not stop there.  Groups 
suffer from an agency problem  Association leaders often do not speak for 
the will of the members but instead look out for their individual interests.  
Finally, groups do not provide the only method through which policy is 
made.  Both elected representatives and individual citizens can have a real 
impact on our government agenda and decisions.87 
This significant lack of clarity in what an ideal polyarchy might look 
like makes it difficult to model a just system.  Building a model upon pure 
democracy, of course, is the easiest.  The principle of one person, one 
political voice could be implemented by ensuring certain processes are 
always followed to respect every citizen’s right to participate in the 
polity’s decision-making.  Obviously, this is far to simple for the complexity 
of a polyarchy.  Nevertheless, modeled off of the one person, one political 
voice principle, we might assume that there should be some sense of 
balance in the interest group sector.  To the extent there is a lack of 
balance we might reasonably conclude that our democracy is coming up 
short on political voice equality.  This model will have significant flaws, but 
it seems a reasonable starting place for policy makers to consider the 
difference in power among groups and among citizens.  If we are trying to 
 
84 TRUMAN, supra note 76, at 59. 
85 E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
35 (1960). 
86 See SCHLOZMAN, supra note 1, at 271–75. 
87 See, e.g., Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How 
Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 89–90 (1986). 
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maximize a social choice function, it again seems reasonable that we  
should not exacerbate the power differential of these groups.  As will be 
discussed more below, we might even try to enhance the voice of some 
weaker groups. 
With this model in mind, the challenges presented by groups in a 
democracy and the collective action problem in the specific context of 
labor interests is considered in the next Part.  What is the relative power 
of labor as compared to business interests and other groups? 
III. LABOR UNIONS: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATIONAL PROBLEMS 
Labor unions negotiate employment terms for all the employees of a 
bargaining unit, make it possible through strike pay for union members to 
strike to obtain better employment benefits, and lobby and engage in 
politicking to obtain the best laws for its members.  Labor unions are 
fundamentally an interest group that provides a collective good and 
service to people who are employees.88  Labor union members tend to 
come from lower to middle income families.  Because of the collective 
action problem discussed below there are reasons to believe labor 
interests will have a hard time organizing to advance their political voice.  
The potential group of labor union members is large and the individual 
return from organizing is likely far less than the costs of joining.  
Furthermore, by law, to act on behalf of labor, a majority of employees in 
a bargaining unit must vote for a particular labor union.  This means that 
labor unions face a severe collective action problem.89 
“[M]ovements by the ‘powerless’ require strong and sustained 
outside support.”90  Those who earn an hourly wage working for a 
company have long tended to have great challenges acting collectively.  
Additionally, they have little role or say in the acts taken by their 
corporate employers.91  Businesses made up of a few organizations that 
possess money and skills tend to have a much easier time organizing and 
representing their interests before the government.92  Thus, we should 
expect our political balance to be skewed away from labor interests and 
towards business interests. 
This Part finds the power of labor as compared to some other 
interests within our democracy to be particularly weak.  Additionally, this 
 
88 JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 119 (1995). 
89 Id. 
90 J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements 
(1946–1972), 42 AM. SOC. REV. 249, 251 (1977). 
91 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 283 (1998). 
92 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 279. 
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Part evaluates the composition of labor unions and finds that there is not 
significant diversity of voices among different labor interests or localities.  
Certain regions and certain occupations are much more represented 
through this system.  This unequal state of affairs in the interest group 
ecosystem seems to be consistent across the interest group domain.  
Finally, it looks at evidence on whether unions represent some common 
will of their members.  It finds that there is evidence that the 
representation is biased to a certain extent towards managers.  This is 
consistent as well across the interest group domain.  Thus, 
problematically, even if labor is representing some labor voices, there are 
lots of labor voices that are left out of the political system. 
A. Collective Action Problem and Labor Union Evidence 
The theory of collective action predicts that interests made up of a 
small number of individuals under circumstances where the return from 
the interest being fulfilled is high will be more likely to organize than those 
interests held by many where the return is small.93 
Citizens who have a shared interest in some good or service may 
desire to get their government to provide the good, service, or policy.  If 
we assume that this citizen is the rational, economically interested 
woman, when she looks at the question of whether to seek from the 
government the provision of that good, service, or policy she will make an 
economic calculation.  Will the return from her effort be greater than the 
cost?  We can also refer to this sought good, service or policy as a 
collective good.  By that I mean that once the good is provided, it will be 
provided to everyone.  Thus, there will be a couple of challenges.  
Generally, the return of these types of collective goods is going to be 
smaller than the costs.  Additionally, because the good is available to all, 
there is a free rider problem. 
Under Mancur Olson’s theory, industries populated by few players 
should be successful in organizing to seek their interests while individuals 
with shared interests who are vast in quantity, like manufacturing 
workers, should generally not be successful in organizing.94  Similarly, we 
should expect to see differences in ability to organize based on human 
and capital resources.  Those interests associated with wealth and 
education are much more likely to organize than those associated with 
poverty and lack of education.  Evidence is strong that the basic contours 
 
93 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 57–59. 
94 COLLECTIVE ACTION, at 57–59. 
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of these predictions hold.95  Small wealthy groups form organizations with 
greater ease than large disperse organizations with small value to each 
individual member. However, the theory is not perfect. There is evidence 
that some citizen movements organize more often than Olson’s theory 
predicted.96 
Large groups seem to solve the collective action problem through 
three primary means: force of law, selective incentives, or purposive 
incentives.97  Trade associations and unions are both sometimes able to 
overcome the collective action problem by force of law.  For instance, a 
legislative body might pass a law forcing those interested in working in a 
particular profession to join a professional association, like a state bar, in 
order to work; in union parlance, this describes a “closed shop.”  
“[S]elective incentives” refer to selling a good or service that the seller can 
exclude others from acquiring, such as magazines or insurance.98  Finally, 
“purposive incentives” refer to incentives associated with feeling good 
morally or otherwise because you join a group.99 
Olson considered labor unions in his book setting forth his theory of 
collection action.  He found evidence of the challenge of labor to organize 
in the history of the labor movement.  Early U.S. labor unions mostly 
consisted of local “small-scale production” operations, like building trades, 
shoemakers, and printers, rather than fields characterized as large 
manufacturing operations.100  Olson thought this state of affairs was a 
result of the fact that social benefits of the smaller unions were easier for 
members to see.  Nevertheless, over time there was a tendency for the 
small unions to connect on a national level.  Although unions start small, 
there is a natural tendency towards local unions organizing with a national 
union.  Locals join national organizations because the connection to a 
larger groups provides real insurance effects. More importantly though, 
locals join a national organization for the simple fact that an employer 
finds it relatively easy to break a strike led only in one localized union.101 
As mentioned, one of the ways any interest can solve the collective 
action problem is to get a law passed mandating those interested in 
working in a particular job to join that organization.  To Olson, the 
predominant means by which large unions overcame the collective action 
 
95 See SCHLOZMAN, supra note 1, at 319–20. 
96 Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 390, 396 (1983). 
97 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 277, 282. 
98 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 277. 
99 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 282. 
100 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 66. 
101 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 67–68. 
HACKNEY PROP UP HEAVENLY DRAFT 11917  11/9/2017  5:46 PM 
126 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:nn   
problem was by implementing closed shops.  There were some closed 
shops in early U.S. history, including carters in the 1600s, shoemakers in 
the 1800s, and printers later in the 1800s.102  Problematically for unions, 
Congress banned the closed shop in the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, as 
described in Part IV below. 
Labor unions have also long offered various selective incentives, such 
as insurance-related benefits, to attract members.  This might include 
death, unemployment, disability or old age benefits.103  Only large unions 
today tend to offer significant benefits such as education, scholarships, 
and medical care.104  The growth of government provided benefits such as 
social security and unemployment insurance, have likely cut significantly 
into the selective incentives a union can offer. 
Finally, labor unions use “purposive incentives.” In the case of 
industrial low-skilled diverse work-forces, it is thought that the only 
purposive incentive that is effective pre-union shop in organizing is “to be 
aroused by emotionally charged and comprehensive appeals to their lot as 
a dispossessed class.”105  The Industrial Workers of the World represented 
many such individuals in pre-union shop situations, and its many efforts 
led to intense and often violent strikes.106  These purposive incentives 
almost certainly continue to play a role in union development and 
maintenance in the U.S. today.  This aspect of union organizing leads to 
one of one of the negative features of unions:  They tend to come with 
violence both from laborers and employers.107  Of course, to obtain any 
legal protections at all, a union first must overcome the collective action 
challenge.   
What does the balance of power of labor unions, as compared to 
other types of interest groups, look like today?  In an analysis of pure 
numbers of interest groups, representing the whole of the interest group 
sector at the Washington D.C. federal government level, labor unions 
made up only one percent of the interest group sector.108  Comparatively, 
corporations made up 34.9%, trade and other business associations 
13.2%, and occupational associations 6.8%.109  While there are many other 
types of interests in our government that diverge from capital versus 
 
102 COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 69. 
103 WILSON, supra note 88, at 124. 
104 WILSON, supra note 88, at 124. 
105 WILSON, supra note 88, at 128. 
106 WILSON, supra note 88, at 128. 
107 See, e.g., PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 68–83 (1964) (discussing a 
particularly violent period of U.S. labor history). 
108 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 321 tbl. 11.3. 
109 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 321 tbl. 11.3. 
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labor, this suggests at least that something is out of balance in this 
representational system.  A review of the interest group environment at 
the state level demonstrates this severe imbalance as well.110 
What about if we look at political representation as compared to 
employment status?  In 2001, our U.S. workforce comprised 64 percent of 
the population.111  Different roles were filled in the following ways: 
executives 9.0%, professionals 10.2%, white collar workers 18.4%, blue 
collar workers 24.0%, farm workers 1.5%, unemployed 3.2%, and not in 
workforce 33.1%.112  How were each of these interests represented in the 
interest group sector?  Executives 73.9%, professionals 17.3%, white collar 
workers 3.4%, blue collar workers 1.1%, farm workers 1.7%, unemployed 
1.2%, and not in the workforce 1.4%.113  Again, the degree of inequality in 
representation of organized interests compared to labor is intense. 
For labor, the story gets worse in a dynamic sense.  When one looks 
at the change in total number of groups, labor unions saw no growth 
between 1981 and 2006.114  Meanwhile, the political interest with the 
least amount of increase increased in number by 32 percent, and the 
greatest sector increase was 883 percent, represented by health 
interests.115  Labor unions thus shrunk from an already low 1.6% of the 
interest group sector to just 0.8% of that sector.116  More worrisome yet 
for labor as a matter of political voice is the striking decline in labor union 
members in the workforce. 
In another measure of political voice, the number of opportunities 
union staff has to testify in front of Congress is highly correlated with 
union density.117  Instances of union congressional testimony have 
dropped consistently with membership declines.118  Likewise, scholars 
estimate that membership is the biggest determinant of electoral success 
for a union.119  Others show that a greater number of members means 
 
110 David Lowery & Virginia Gray, Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural 
Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1, 21 tbl. 2 
(1995) [hereinafter Population Ecology]. 
111 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 329 fig. 11.1. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 353 tbl. 12.1. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 356 tbl. 12.2. 
117 Kyle W. Albert, An Analysis of Labor Union Participation in U.S. Congressional Hearings, 
28 SOC. F. 574, 587 (2013). 
118 Id. at 586–87. 
119 DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1970). 
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more voters and more opportunities for financial contributions.120  In a 
seminal lobbying study looking at the trajectory of 139 issues over the 
years 1999 to 2002, the authors spotted this same sense of highly limited 
union representation before Congress.121  Although the unions made up 
six percent of the mentions, those mentions were really only from about 
six unions, where most other interests were represented by a range of 
interest groups.122 
Not surprisingly, studies show that labor unions tend to be outspent 
in lobbying by corporations, business associations, and professional 
associations.  Labor averaged under $500,000 lobbying per union, while 
the other three averaged all over $1,000,000.123  Additionally, while 
corporations and business associations are very likely to have highly 
connected lobbyists, labor unions seldom have such officials represent 
their interests.124  Finally, while unions do tend to have a higher average in 
political activity committee spending, there are so many fewer of these 
unions that labor as a broad interest is well outspent in this arena too.125 
One other interesting and disconcerting fact for labor unions is that 
interests trying to overcome the collective action challenge can also face a 
crowding out problem.126  Virginia Gray and David Lowery suggest that 
there is an ecosystem of interest groups that is determinative of the size 
and scope of that interest group sector.127  Under population ecology 
theory, the number of a certain entity type is dependent upon things that 
allow the entity type to exist. “[I]nterest-group density is set at an 
equilibrium level by the environment.”128  Gray and Lowery find a positive 
relationship between interest group size and population, constituent 
interest in goods and services, the certainty of those interests, the age of 
the interest system, and the size of the government.129  In the end, there 
are only so many organizations a certain population can support.  Once it 
 
120 Marrick F. Masters & John Thomas Delaney, Union Political Activities: A Review of the 
Empirical Literature, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 336 (1987). 
121 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND 
WHY 9–10 (2009) [hereinafter LOBBYING AND POLICY]. 
122 Id. at 10. 
123 Id. at 200. However, Baumgartner and co-authors do not find a strong connection 
between policy outcomes and resources. Business seems to wind slightly more often, but not at 
some significant rate. Id. at 203. They do not argue this does not mean money does not matter. 
Instead they believe that the matter that money made happened in most instances long ago. Id. 
at 212–14. 
124 LOBBYING AND POLICY, at 200. 
125 LOBBYING AND POLICY, at 200. 
126 JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM 60 (1999). 
127 Population Ecology, at 1. 
128 Population Ecology, at 9. 
129 Population Ecology, at 12. 
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has filled its capacity, whether with environmental, business, and health 
organizations, or charities, trade associations, and social welfare 
organizations, the group system can run out of capacity to support more 
organizations. 
There is a major caveat to the collective action research project. The 
work must be understood in light of a problem present in all of these 
studies:130  It is impossible to know what an unbiased interest group sector 
would look like.131  The Schattschneider vision of bias in the heavenly 
chorus is based on a notion the interest group sector in an ideal sense 
would be isomorphic with society.  As Schlozman suggests, the baseline 
for comparing organizational representation of interests might be to 
assume one person, one vote.132  But, there is no reason to believe this 
would ever be the case.  We should expect in fact that the interest group 
sector will always diverge from that pure democracy notion.  It is costly to 
organize.  This means that the many interests will never organize.  People 
tend to organize around certain factors, such as loss more than the 
prospect of gain.133  The dynamics of need for organizational involvement 
should necessarily ebb and flow over time, such that it should never be 
expected that organizations exactly mirror individual interests.134 
B.  What do Unions Look Like Today? 
 
Unionization makes a difference to the bottom line of workers.  
Union workers earn a premium, as compared to non-union workers.  Non-
union workers earned 79 percent of the weekly median salary of a union 
worker.135  But, unions are quickly shrinking and we do not find 
unionization equally across regions or job type. 
In 2015, 14.8 million workers belonged to a union in the United 
States.136  This made up 11.1% of the workforce.  This is a significant 
decline from 1983, when 17.7 million workers belonged to a union, 
 
130 David Lowery et al., Images of an Unbiased Interest System, 22 J. EUR. PUB. 1212, 1221–
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131 David Lowery & Virginia Gray, Bias in the Heavenly Chorus: Interests in Society and 
Before Government, 16 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 6 (2004) [hereinafter Bias in the Heavenly]. 
132 Kay Lehman Schlozman, What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality and the 
American Pressure System, 46 J. POL. 1006, 1008–09 (1984). 
133 Bias in the Heavenly, at 10–11. 
134 Bias in the Heavenly, at 13. 
135 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members 2016 
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
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making up 20.3% of the workforce.137  And, in 1954, 39 percent of the 
private sector workforce was unionized.138  Public sector unions far 
outpace their private sector counterparts today.  In 2015, over 35 percent 
of public sector workers were unionized, compared to only 6.7% of private 
workers.139  In fact, at the local government level, 41.3% of the workforce 
is unionized.140  The protective service industries—police officers and 
firefighters, and education and libraries – make up the largest sector of 
unions today.141  Union membership rates are highly state-dependent, 
with New York exhibiting the highest rate of unionization at 24.7% and 
South Carolina the lowest rate at 2.1%.142 
The IRS tracks data regarding labor unions and other tax-exempt 
organizations like business leagues exempt under section 501(c)(6). While 
this data is not perfect because it only captures those organizations filing 
applications and annual tax returns with the IRS and it depends on the 
self-reporting of the entities, it does paint a relative picture to consider. In 
that data you can see a similar reduction in labor unions particularly as 
compared to business leagues. In looking at the rate of formation, it 
appears that for every 1 labor union that forms, more than 3 business 
leagues have formed from 2005 to 2016.143 Additionally, the total number 
of unions registered with the IRS has continually shrunk from around 
72,000 in 1990 to just under 47,000 in 2016.144 Business leagues on the 
other hand increased in number from 1990 (66,000) through 2010 
(92,000), then declined through 2016 (64,000).145 Total assets and revenue 
recorded with the IRS in Form 990 filings in comparison show a little 
cleaner picture. While labor held about 70 percent of the assets held by 
 
137 Id. 
138 Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the US Labor Movement? 
Union Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 95, 97 (1999). 
139 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members 2016 




 143 IRS Data BOOKS maintain that information from 2005-2016 on Table 24a. You can find 
those here: https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-irs-data-book. The rate is the author’s 
own calculation. 
 144 IRS Data Books 1990 Table 25 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16databk.pdf and 2016 
Table 25 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16databk.pdf. As a result of Congress passing law in 
2006 that forced small tax exempt organizations to file limited information with the IRS or lose 
their tax exempt status, the entire tax exempt sector began declining in 2010. However the rate 
of labor decline was almost continuous from 1990-2016.  
 145 As a result of Congress passing law in 2006 in the Pension Protection Act that forced 
small tax exempt organizations to file limited information with the IRS or lose their tax exempt 
status, the entire tax exempt sector began declining in 2010. This makes the data a bit messier 
than it would otherwise appear. 
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business leagues in 1990, it held only 54 percent in 2000 and then 46 
percent in 2013.146 Total assets for labor unions rose from a little more  
than $13 billion in 1990 to almost $37 billion in 2013. Assets just rose 
more for business leagues from $19 billion to $80 billion over the same 
period.  Revenue of labor unions went from 67 percent of business league 
revenue to only 51 percent of business league revenue from 1990 to 2013. 
Union demographics have changed fairly significantly over the past 
70 years. A study of the changing demographic trends in labor from 1952 
to 1999 shows a change of unionized non-agricultural workforce 
percentage from 33.2% in 1955 to 13.9% in 1999.147 In 2016 it was 10.7 
percent.  Although in the 1950s and 1960s the union workforce was over 
80 percent blue-collar, by 1998, white-collar workers were the majority, 
making up 55 percent of the unionized workforce.148  Although in 1952 
almost 90 percent of union members were male, in 1998, over 40 percent 
of union members were female.149 That number kept increasing. By 2016 
women made up 46 percent of union members.150  Although in the 1950s 
almost no union members had any college experience much less a college 
degree, in 1996, 25 percent of union members had some college or were 
college graduates.151  By 2008 37.5 percent of union workers held a 
college degree or greater.152 Although in 1952 90 percent of union 
members were white, in 1998, only 80 percent were white.153  The largest 
non-white group of union members in 1998 was comprised of 
Hispanics.154  In 1999, black men had a higher rate of unionization at 
17.2% than whites at 13.5% or Hispanics at 11.9%.155 
Today, public sector unions are the dominant unionized employees, 
with teachers’ unions, such as the National Education Association and the 
 
 146 IRS Statistics of Income Charities and other Tax-Exempt Organizations Statistics from 
1990 to 2013. https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other-tax-exempt-
organizations-statistics 
147 HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA 26 (2001) 
[hereinafter AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS]. 
148 Id. at 28–29. 
149 Id. at 30. 
150 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members 2016, Table 1 
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
151  AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS  at 33. That percentage is apparently the same as the general 
population. 
 152 JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, THE CHANGING FACE 
OF LABOR 1983-2008, (2009), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/changing-face-of-labor-
2009-11.pdf. 
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HACKNEY PROP UP HEAVENLY DRAFT 11917  11/9/2017  5:46 PM 
132 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:nn   
American Federation of Teachers, making up a large part of that force.156  
The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees has 
also demonstrated significant growth, from 250,000 in the mid-1960s157 to 
1.6 million in 2016.158  President Kennedy spurred the growth of federal 
unions in 1963 when he signed Executive Order 10988, which allowed 
public employees to engage in collective bargaining.  Public sector unions 
also vote at a much greater rate than other sectors in favor of union 
certification.159 
Although the legal environment in different states and changes in 
different occupations impact this unequal relationship,160 there are likely 
other forces at work leading to different unions being successful in certain 
businesses.  For one, it tends to be easiest to form unions where the 
employees sought bear significant likeness in position, skill-level, location, 
religion, or ethnicity.161  Associations that are formed around one 
occupation are more likely to form and survive than those of more diverse 
interests.162  Once one brings in a diverse population, the collective action 
problem becomes much more severe.  In some countries, for instance, the 
union shop agreement is not the norm at all, but the exception.  There, 
however, it appears that in many instances unions are held together via 
some other unionizing force such as religion—Catholic or anti-Catholic—or 
ideology—Marxist, socialist.163 
C. Do Labor Unions Represent the Common Will of Its Membership? 
In an article focused heavily on democracy, it is important to discuss 
whether a union represents the interests of its members, through a 
democratic process or otherwise.  This raises the question again of 
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whether it is possible to generate some common good of a group.  
Whether unions represent the common interest of members or not 
should at least implicate whether we think of them as advancing the cause 
of democracy. 
Not unlike the findings that our democracy is skewed towards 
wealthier interests,164 within interest groups themselves, large patrons 
tend to sway the view expressed of many nonprofit institutions.165  
Business associations seem to show a strong tendency towards 
representing the wealthiest interest among a group rather than the 
median interest.166  I have not found evidence specifically demonstrating 
that labor unions suffer from this problem.  This may be because labor 
unions tend to be very dependent upon the union dues model; they likely 
are not able to use a significantly increasing sliding scale fee schedule in 
the way that business associations tend to adopt.  Labor unions directly 
represent individuals rather than institutions. 
Does this mean that the leaders of unions are more likely to 
represent the individuals?  While there are indications that unions, at 
times, adopt relatively democratic means, the stronger evidence is that 
leaders tend to diverge from the majority interest of union members, at 
least in part.  Of course, it may be more accurate to state that the labor 
union members, like many people, are focused more on their own 
economic situation than any outside politics. 
Although I describe labor unions as interest groups, most members 
do not join primarily for the interest group activities.  They join because 
the union negotiates contracts with management and protects employees 
from unfair management actions.167  One study suggests job security is the 
number one motivating factor for joining a union.168  As Professor Moe 
states, union members “stress economic benefits, they place high value on 
selective incentives, their membership is not contingent upon political 
considerations, and their individual contributions have little political 
impact.”169  This simple fact sets up an agency problem when union 
leaders represent union members before government.  The interests of 
 
164 MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE 1, 1 (2012). 
165 Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 390, 401–02 (1983). 
166 Michael L. Barnett, One Voice, But Whose Voice? Exploring What Drives Trade 
Association Activity, 52 BUS. & SOC’Y 213, 219 (2012). 
167 HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA 47 (2001); see also 
TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL 
INTEREST GROUPS 172 (1988). 
168 Id. at 173. 
169 Id. at 174–75. 
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union leaders may not align with union members, and members may not 
pay close attention to this fact.  Remember though this is not unique to 
labor unions. Business association leaders also diverge in representation 
of members, although they diverge towards the wealthier interests. 
Leaders of unions tend to diverge in beliefs from their members.  
Leaders tend to believe strongly in the union as part of the labor 
movement.170  In a study of members of Ohio unions, it was found that 
while a plurality of members stated they belonged to the Democratic 
Party, at the same time, the members believed approximately two-thirds 
of leadership identified with the Democratic Party.171  Anecdotal evidence 
supports this divergence as well.  A labor attorney, Thomas Geoghegan, 
reports one union member expressing:  “The guys who start out running 
for Union office? Don’t trust them. They’re out for themselves.”172  The 
union member suggests there are some good ones, but that most are 
motivated by self-interest. 
A fair amount of discussion of unions revolves around the question of 
whether unions themselves are democratic.  This question relates directly 
to the question of whether the union somehow mirrors the will of those it 
represents.  In the 1950s, at the height of union power, Lipset, Trow, and 
Coleman published a seminal study on union democracy by examining the 
International Typographical Union—the only union at the time with a two-
party system.173  Lipset and coauthors were impressed with ITU’s 
democracy.  However, they ultimately found it unlikely that democracy 
would prevail in most unions.174  They believed that large organizations 
simply did not permit the pure democracy envisioned by theorists.175  
Despite this critical assessment of the possibility of democracy within 
unions, the authors still concluded that unions were important elements 
of maintaining some level of democracy in a polyarchy.176 
More modern studies have considered the same question and have 
found the Lipset determination too constraining on the definition of 
democracy and too pessimistic.177  They have found that many unions use 
some important democratic features to make their decisions.  
 
170 Moe, supra note 167, at 175. 
171 Id. 
172 THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 183 (1992). 
173 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INSIDE POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (1956). 
174 UNION DEMOCRACY, at 403. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 413. 
177 Tom Langford, Union Democracy as a Foundation for a Participatory Society: A 
Theoretical Elaboration and Historical Example, 76 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 79, 82–83 (2015). 
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Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that unions operate like the New 
England town democracy of Robert Dahl.178  As is to be expected, a small 
group of individuals tend to make the decisions of these organizations and 
that small group of leaders’ ideology likely differs in some part from a 
large portion of the union’s membership.  Nevertheless, labor union 
members probably have more democratic rights than any other members 
of a nonprofit organization because of the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act.179  That Act provides a Bill of Rights to union members 
ensuring them democratic procedures in the operation of the union. 
D. Implications for a Model To Judge Political Voice Equality 
I adopt the intrinsic equality principle as the basis of a model to 
assess current policy.  There is no one better than each individual to 
decide for herself how her life should be governed.  While many in our 
society today think of one person, one vote as the defining principle of a 
modern representative democracy, the intrinsic equality principle 
demands more.180  A principle of one person, one political voice is more 
descriptive of that ideal model.  As we assess our U.S. system, we should 
strive toward political voice equality.  The key here is, in assessing political 
fairness, we should be maximizing a social choice function rather than a 
social welfare function.  The question in political fairness is not whether a 
person realized a particular governance decision outcome but whether 
her political voice was respected as a part of the political process.  This 
model means that in evaluating the question of labor union tax policy we 
should be less concerned about harmful or positive impacts on the 
economy brought on by labor unions than we should be in whether labor 
unions increase political voice equality. 
Political voice equality in a small group would be relatively easy to 
assess.  We could use some process like Robert’s Rules of Order to ensure 
everyone in the group had her voice respected in decision-making.  
However, in a polyarchy the question of political voice equality becomes 
much more difficult to determine.181  In part, political voice equality is 
found in the exercise of the vote in free and fair elections to determine 
representatives who will discuss and determine final policy for our polity.  
However, elections don’t provide complete political voice opportunities.  
 
178 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 
(2nd ed. 2005). 
179 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (Sept. 
14, 1959). 
180 Schlozman, supra note 1, at 36. 
181 See supra Part III.A, particularly notes 108–12. 
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Citizens depend largely upon interest groups to fulfill that function.182  
Establishing an unbiased interest system is difficult because it is hard to 
determine the different types of distinct interests in existence, who a 
group is acting for, how effective any group might be at having its voice 
heard, how representative of a group an interest group might be, and how 
to determine what that interest system should look like over time. 
Nevertheless, we have many guideposts that can help us make a 
determination regarding political voice equality.  For instance, collective 
action theory provides a way of assessing which interests will face the 
most severe collective action challenges.  Additionally, extensive studies 
illustrate the ebb and flow of the interest sector over time and we can 
compare that to the total population.  While these various theoretical and 
empirical strategies do not allow us to be precise in any way in policy 
choices, they do help to sketch out the broad outlines of a biased system.  
That sketch should at least aid us in thinking about the public policy we 
adopt so that we can try to build a policy that does not exacerbate the 
bias of that system.  We might even, under certain circumstances, work to 
ameliorate that bias where the considered judgment of theory and 
empirical evidence is that the bias is stark. 
Thus, with labor unions, theory predicts labor interests will be 
underrepresented in our democratic system.  Theory also predicts many 
wealthy business interests will not suffer such collective action problems 
such that there will be a bias in the interest system of business as 
compared to labor.  The evidence suggests this bias is real, increasing, and 
stark.183  We could look deeper to see if in fact policy preferences indeed 
tilt away from the general interests of labor, but under the social choice 
function model adopted here, there is no need to further assess that 
matter.  Based on the fact that labor is broadly left out of the political 
discussion, particularly when compared with that of business, we could 
embark on policy choices to change that reality. 
IV. LABOR UNIONS: HISTORY AND TAX LAW 
A. Very Brief History 
Labor associations in a sense have been a part of the U.S. since 
before its inception.  However, it is worthwhile making a distinction 
between what some refer to as trade associations and trade unions.  A 
trade association, what I have referred to above as a business association 
 
182 See supra Introduction, at 3. 
183 See discussion in Part III.B. 
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or business league, is typically made up of independent businessmen who 
are trying to protect the price of the goods or services that they sell.184  
Trade unions, or what I am referring to here as labor unions, are made up 
of wage earners who organize to earn a better wages, and better working 
conditions for themselves.185  The former were around at the inception of 
the U.S., while the latter begin in the late 1700s.186  A society of 
Philadelphia shoemakers in 1792 formed the first trade union in the 
U.S.;187 it did not last a year.  The early unions were made up of trades 
such as cordwainers, printers, and tailors, and seemed to be associated 
with a growing ability to mass produce goods.188 
A major roadblock to forming trade unions at the time was that they 
were generally illegal under U.S. law.  For instance, New York cordwainers 
were convicted of conspiracy to raise wages and operating a closed 
shop.189  Journeymen tailors in Philadelphia were similarly convicted in 
1827.190  In 1840, though, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that it 
was not illegal for laborers to so organize.  This was a legal turning point 
for labor.191 
Realistically, the U.S. was largely made up of farmers at the time.192  
In 1820, farmers comprised 71.8% of our workforce.193  The growth of 
labor unions appears to be connected to industrialization in the north.  
Between 1860 and 1870, factory workers increased from 1.3 million to 2 
million.194  For the first time, there were more factory workers than 
farmhands.195  At this point, there were a total of 5.5 million non-farm 
workers with a population of 35.2 million people in the country.196  The 
country’s first national labor union, called the National Labor Union, was 
organized in 1866.197  Still, until the formation of the American Federation 
of Labor (“AFL”) in 1886, national unionization efforts were neither 
cohesive nor effective.198  The signal success of the union organization 
 
184 PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (1964). 
185 Id. 
186 Id.; SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 1 (rev. ed., Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1920). 
187 Taft, supra note 184, at 5. 
188 Id. at 3–5. 
189 Id. at 10. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 11. 
192 RUSSELL O. WRIGHT, CHRONOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2003). 
193 Id. 
194 PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN AMERICA 71 (2010). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id.at 75. 
198 DAVID TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 4, 68 (Knopf ed. 1951). 
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effort of the AFL was that it was based on organizing groups of skilled 
individuals that had commonality and who were interested in protecting 
their particular wage.199 
Labor unions saw their greatest rise in the period between 1897 and 
1904.  During that time union membership increased from 477,000 to 
2,072,000 members.200  This period also appears to be an apex of the fight 
for the closed shop.201  Business associations and the government reacted 
strongly to this effort and stemmed the tide starting in 1904 when 
Theodore Roosevelt and the National Association of Manufacturers led 
the effort against unions.202  Union membership rates then remained 
relatively stable between 1935 and 1945.203  Not insignificantly, Congress 
enacted the Wagner Act in 1935, making collective bargaining a policy of 
the U.S.204  The Supreme Court found the Act constitutional in 1937.  
Union membership increased by 57 percent that year.205  The Act gave 
many protections to unions and included in its provisions the right to a 
closed shop. 
In the 1950s, union membership achieved its greatest membership in 
relation to the workforce.206  However, as discussed above in Part III, 
union membership  has had its most significant decline over the past 30 
years.  Many forces have played a role in this decline, including structural 
changes in our economy, bad political instincts of labor union leaders, 
aggressive employers successfully utilizing anti-union tactics, and even a 
lessening of support among workers for unions.  Nevertheless, scholars 
have little agreement on the real cause.207  This trend does seem to be 
universal across nations, but the decline in the U.S. is particularly 
significant.208 
B. Tax Exempt Requirements for Labor Unions 
Congress exempted labor unions—“labor organization,” actually—
from tax first in the Tariff Act of 1909.209  In its initial drafting, the Senate 
Finance Committee did not include the phrase “labor organization,” 
 
199 Id. 
200 COLLECTIVE ACTION, at 77. 
201 Id. at 78. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 79. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, at 87. 
207 Id. at 89. 
208 Id. at 91. 
209 Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 36 Stat. 11. 
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because it believed the idea was covered by “fraternal beneficiary 
societies . . . operating under the lodge system, and providing for the 
payment of life, sick, accident, and other benefits.”210  After labor unions 
complained, however, Congress added the phrase “labor organization” to 
the statute.211  Others argue that labor unions were worried that the 
taxation of insurance companies would ensure that labor unions that 
engaged in some insurance activities would be subject to tax under the 
Code.212  Congress maintained the exemption of labor unions in the 1913 
Income Tax Act and additionally added the terms we know today of labor, 
agricultural, and horticultural organizations.213  I focus only on the labor 
portion of the statute.  Agricultural and horticultural organizations bear 
much more in common with trade associations exempt under section 
501(c)(6) of the Code.214 
To qualify under section 501(c)(5), a labor union: (1) may not allow its 
earnings to inure to the benefit of its members, and (2) must “have as [its] 
objects the betterment of the conditions of those engaged in such 
pursuits, the improvement of the grade of their products, and the 
development of a higher degree of efficiency in their respective 
occupations.”215  A labor union must serve individuals who are considered 
to be “labor.”216  Thus, for instance, an organization of “drivers, trainers, 
and horse owners, most of whom are independent contractors or 
entrepreneurs,” did “not qualify for exemption as a labor [union].”217 
Courts have interpreted the term “labor organization” liberally to 
ensure the protection of labor interests.218  In that vein, the IRS found an 
apprenticeship committee organized primarily to establish standards in 
skilled crafts, determine the qualifications necessary to become a 
journeyman, and aid in adjusting and settling disputes between the 
employer and the apprentice, qualified as a labor union.219 
 
210 44 Cong.Rec. 4154–55 (1909). 
211 See, e.g., 44 CONG. REC. 4154 (1909); 44 CONG. REC. 4155 (1909). 
212 James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523, 530–31 
(1976) (citing 44 CONG. REC. 4149, 4154, 4155 (1909)). 
213 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 172. 
214 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 23, at 353 n. 148. 
215 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1(a). 
216 Rev. Rul. 76-420, 1976-2 C.B. 153 (1976). 
217 Rev. Rul. 78-288, 1978-2 C.B. 179 (1978). See also Rev. Rul. 74-167, 1974-1 C.B. 134 
(1974) (“[I]nclusion of some self-employed persons in the membership of a qualified labor 
[union] does not affect the organization's exempt status.”). 
218 Portland Coop. Labor Temple Ass’n v. Comm’r, 39 B.T.A. 450 (1939). 
219 Rev. Rul. 59-6, 1959-1 C.B. 121 (1959). 
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Typical exempt activities of a labor union include collective 
bargaining,220 publishing labor newspapers,221 allocating work assignments 
among union members,222 and providing litigation support to controlling 
unions.223  A teacher’s association that “sponsors seminars and courses for 
its members, participates in teacher conventions, bargains collectively and 
processes grievances, and keeps its members informed of its activities 
through regular meetings and a newsletter,” qualifies as a labor union.224 
Under IRS guidance, a union can maintain a pension plan and qualify 
as a labor union.225  While IRS guidance prohibits a pension plan to qualify 
as a labor union by itself, there is a circuit split on the issue.  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a pension plan managed jointly by 
an employer and a union qualifies as an exempt labor union.226  The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the IRS that a foreign 
pension fund similarly controlled by an employer and a union did not 
qualify.227  The court reasoned that the pension fund was neither 
controlled by nor represented traditional labor unions. 
A labor union may not operate a business as an exempt purpose even 
if the business is there to solely employ members and turn over all profits 
to the labor union.228  Similarly, an organization controlled by private 
individuals that offers strike insurance does not qualify under section 
501(c)(5).229  Providing ministerial services for labor unions, such as 
 
220 Rev. Rul. 77-154, 1977-1 C.B. 148 (1977) (nurses’ association “whose primary activity is 
acting as a collective bargaining agent for its members qualifies . . . .”). 
221 Rev. Rul. 68-534, 1968-2 C.B. 217 (1968) (labor union that publishes a newspaper 
providing information on union activity is performing an exempt function); S.M. 2558, III-2 C.B. 
207. 
222 Rev. Rul. 75-473, 1975-2 C.B. 213 (“organization, controlled and funded jointly by a 
labor union and an employer association, that operates a dispatch hall to allocate work 
assignments among union members and engages in other activities appropriate to a labor union 
qualifies . . . .”). 
223 Rev. Rul. 74-596, 1974-2 C.B. 167 (organization that provides supporting litigation 
activities, proper for any one of its member unions, directed to the betterment of conditions for 
public employees qualifies). 
224 Rev. Rul. 76-31, 1976-1 C.B. 157 . 
225 Rev. Rul. 62-17, 1962-1 C.B. 87. 
226 Morganbesser v. United States, 984 F.2d 560, 563–64 (1993). 
227 Stichting Pensioenfonds Voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke 
Belangen (PGGM) v. United States, 129 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811 
(1998); see also Tupper v. United States, 134 F.3d 444, 444–45 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that a 
pension plan controlled by an employer and a union did not qualify for exemption as a labor 
union). 
228 Rev. Rul. 69-386, 1969-2 C.B. 123. 
229 Rev. Rul. 76-420, 1976-2 C.B. 153; cf. Rev. Rul. 67-7, 1967-1 C.B. 137 (organization 
established by a labor union to provide strike and lockout benefits to its members is a labor 
union). 
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creating an organization holding employment taxes,230 or establishing 
savings accounts231 for union members, are not validly exempt labor union 
activities. 
The tax law does not impose significant restrictions or disclosure on 
labor unions. However, labor law places significant restrictions and 
disclosure obligations that treat labor unions worse in many ways that 
business associations are treated. Under tax law, labor unions may lobby 
before legislative bodies.232  Like social welfare organizations and business 
leagues, tax law does not require labor unions to publicly disclose its 
donors.233  However, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
requires labor unions to disclose all sources of income in excess of 
$5,000.234  Under tax law, a labor union may intervene in a political 
campaign as long as it does not become a primary activity.235  Federal 
election law, though, prohibits a labor union from spending its treasury 
funds on such political campaigns.236  A labor union might owe a tax under 
section 527(f) for any expenditures it makes on political campaign 
activity.237  To avoid this tax and comply with federal election law, the 
union can set up a segregated fund that is effectively a Political Action 
Committee under section 527.238 
Most unions must file a Form 990 disclosing information regarding its 
financial activities.239  The Form 990 is disclosed publicly.  Nevertheless, 
because labor unions must disclose so much to the Department of Labor, 
such as its donors, and to the FEC, the Form 990 information is probably 
less important for the public than that form is for organizations like 
charities or even business 
 associations. 
 
230 Rev. Rul. 66-354, 1966-2 C.B. 207. 
231 Rev. Rul. 77-46, 1977-1 C.B. 147. 
232 Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328. 
233 A labor union must file a Form 990 and attach a schedule B, Schedule of Contributors. 
That schedule requires a labor union to disclose its substantial donors, who are typically those 
who donate more than $5,000. However, unlike the Form 990, which is publicly disclosed, the 
IRS does not publicly disclose labor union schedule B. 
234 29 U.S.C. § 431. You can find extensive reports about the financial activities of labor 
unions at the website of the Department of Labor here: https://olms.dol-
esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do.  
235 John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities 
of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, IRS Continuing Professional Education Article, L-
1, L-2 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf; Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(5)-1 
(2017) (fails to list intervening in a political campaign as a valid purpose of a labor organization). 
236 11 C.F.R. § 114.4 (2017). 
237 26 U.S.C.A. § 527 (West 2014). 
238 Reilly, supra note 235, at L-6. 
239 26 U.S.C. § 6033. 
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As discussed in Part I above, the exemption from tax in the case of 
labor unions is generally more a matter of deferral, rather than of 
complete exemption.  While there is no charitable contribution deduction 
for union dues, dues are deductible under section 162 as a business 
expense.  Nevertheless, in many instances union members may not be 
able to deduct this expense.  A union member in most instances is 
restricted in deducting dues because dues are an itemized deduction and 
also a miscellaneous itemized deduction subject to the two percent 
floor.240 
V. RATIONALES FOR TAX EXEMPTION 
Few scholars have considered the rationale for labor union tax 
exemption.  One author suggests that the exemption of labor unions may 
have been built upon a principle of nondiscrimination.241  After choosing 
to exempt trade associations, Congress may have felt compelled to 
provide a similar exemption to labor as well.242  The general sense though 
is that exemption for labor unions is a divergence from normal tax law, 
such that to the extent there is income earned in the labor union that is 
not taxed, it is a subsidy to the union and its members.  That subsidy may 
not be large, and is likely of a deferral nature, but it is still a divergence 
from income tax law. 
The earliest consideration of labor union tax exemption appears to 
be by Neale M. Albert and Sanford I.  Hansell, who expressed concern 
about providing a subsidy to an entity that was becoming particularly 
powerful and might cause harm to the economy.243  They found that labor 
unions seemed to generally deserve exemption as a legal matter, at least 
under the system established by Congress.  However, they thought the 
power of labor was beginning to threaten our system of free enterprise 
and skew the labor versus capital collective bargaining arrangement.  
Thus, they thought that Congress should consider limiting the tax 
favorability of the labor union tax system.  Although they thought taxing a 
union on union dues payments inequitable, they thought taxing either 
investment income broadly, or dividends more narrowly, could be 
supported.244 
 
240 Halperin, supra note 26, at 163.; see Bittker, supra note 23, at 307. 
241 James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523, 531 
(1976). 
242 Id. 
243 Neal M. Albert & Sanford I. Hansell, The Tax Status of the Modern Labor Union, 111 U. 
PA. L. REV. 137, 153 (1962). 
244 Id. at 160. 
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Lawrence Stone also found that labor unions should not be exempt 
from tax.245  Stone suggested that while we may not miss the right 
normative tax result by too much, it probably would be easier to handle 
some thorny issues of taxation of these organizations under a cooperative 
model instead.246  David Miller more recently agreed with this basic 
assessment, and argued we should tax labor unions just like we tax social 
clubs: tax investment income and non-member income.247 
George Rahdert and Boris Bittker cursorily considered the rationale 
for labor unions.248  As a mutual benefit organization, established to 
support their members, they believed that any income earned by the 
organization should be allocated to the members and then taxed to 
them.249  They seemed little bothered by labor union tax exemption 
because almost all expenses of a labor union would be deductible to union 
members; the primary benefit of tax exemption would be a matter of 
deferral.250 
Halperin generally reviewed the exemption of mutual benefit 
organizations and found that in the context of business related nonprofits, 
tax exemption provided a deferral benefit that should probably be 
eliminated.251  He believed that elimination should extend to labor unions 
even though they presented a more sympathetic claim for exemption.252  
He does not think the amount of money is substantial because of the fact 
that almost all the money spent by a labor union would be a deductible 
amount, again noting like others that the tax issue is mostly a matter of 
deferral rather than complete avoidance. 
The above approaches tend to focus on whether labor unions should 
be taxed based on whether the activity generates taxable income or not.  
A couple of economists have approached the rationale of tax exemption 
from an economic efficiency point of view.  These analyses generally 
assume that tax exemption provides a subsidy 
Although neither has spoken directly on the issue of tax exemption 
for labor unions, their thought is instructive in thinking about the 
 
245 Lawrence M. Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: 
The Need for a National Policy, 20 U. SO. CAL. TAX INST. 27 (1968). 
246 Id. at 58–60. 
247 David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 67 
TAX LAWYER 451, 452 (2014). 
248 Bittker, supra note 23, at 354–55. 
249 Bittker supra, note 23, at 306. 
250 Id. at 354. 
251 Daniel Halperin, The Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 166 
(2006). 
252 Id. at 163. 
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question.  Henry Hansmann argues that the nonprofit sector tends to 
provide goods that are undersupplied because of contract failure.253  
Burton Weisbrod argued that we should not only expect under-
investment in collective goods by the private sector, but that we should 
also expect underinvestment from the public sector, and government as 
well.254  For both Hansmann and Weisbrod, tax exemption is one possible, 
if flawed, way of remedying the undersupply of these identified goods.  
Collective goods—sometimes called public goods—consist of those goods 
or services that once provided to one, cannot be excluded from any.255  
Weisbrod developed a simplistic model of a society with a private for-
profit sector and a public governmental sector.256  He assumes that in any 
society, for-profit firms will tend to provide a certain amount of private 
goods.  The government, in turn, will provide a certain amount of 
collective goods.257  Weisbrod assumes, though, that the government will 
never provide an optimal level of collective goods; it will only provide the 
level desired by the median voter.  Although private firms may provide 
some private goods that are collective good substitutes, they will never be 
sufficient.258  He argues that public subsidy of voluntary behavior can work 
to supply collective goods that meet the needs of the non-median 
voter.259  This theory is typically referred to as the government failure 
theory. 
Hansmann focuses on market failure.  He argues that nonprofit firms 
are likely the most efficient provider of certain goods and services subject 
to significant contract failure.260  By contract failure, he means those 
goods or services whose provision does not happen at an optimal level 
because of some market failure, such as asymmetric information.  For 
instance, the provision of goods or services to poor people on behalf of 
donors is subject to substantial contract failure because the purchaser—
the donor—cannot easily confirm that the goods or services are delivered 
to the poor person.  Thus, we should expect fewer donations than is 
 
253 Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate 
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67–9 (1981). 
254 See generally Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of The Voluntary Non-Profit Sector 
in a Three-Sector Economy (March 3–4, 1972) (Institute for Research on Poverty, Discussion 
Papers). 
255 COLLECTIVE ACTION, at 14–15. 
256 Weisbrod, at 27. 
257 Weisbrod, at 23. 
258 Weisbod, at 11. 
259 Weisbrod, at 30–32. See also John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 GEO. L.J. 1057, 
1078 n. 87 (2016) (discussing the nature of public goods, collective goods, and private goods, 
and the lack of a clear cut definition between these items). 
260 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 70. 
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optimal.  Nonprofit firms, he suggests, are the most efficient providers in 
such contract failure situations.261  Finally, the subsidy is well matched to 
nonprofit needs because nonprofits do not have access to equity markets 
and tax exemption helps ease that burden.262 
Hansmann does not claim that this rationale is a strong one, only a 
sufficient one.263  He believes that, on economic efficiency grounds, we 
should be slightly better off with the capital subsidy of tax exemption.264  
Hansmann suggests that a useful method for assessing whether nonprofits 
make more sense within an industry is to observe whether there is a for-
profit counterpart in that industry.  That there is a large for-profit 
contingent in the industry is evidence that the nonprofit firm may not be 
the most efficient provider of the service or good.  However, it is not 
conclusive evidence. 
While Hansmann does not apply his theory to labor unions, he does 
consider its application to mutual nonprofits generally.  He argues that 
social clubs, such as country clubs, likely do not face capital formation 
challenges.265  Country clubs and other such organizations are easily able 
to attract the funds they need for their operations.  He also believes they 
do not really suffer from a contract failure.  It is not clear how Hansmann 
would apply his analysis to labor unions.  I will turn to this in my analysis 
towards the conclusion of the Article. 
In a political justification, some, including justices of the U.S.  
Supreme Court, have argued that nonprofits foster pluralism.266  There is a 
strong traditional sense that the nonprofit sector is a place for 
experimentation and the generation and dissemination of ideas that are 
critical to a healthy democracy.  This American love of voluntary 
associations fulfilling this deeply democratic purpose was noticed by 
Alexis de Toqueville who wrote with admiration of the American tendency 
to form associations to accomplish all sorts of objects that might typically 
have been left to the government.267 
 
261 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 74. 
262 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 74. 
263 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 75. 
264 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 92. 
265 Hansmann, supra note 253, at 94. 
266 BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.4 (9th ed. 2007); Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609–10 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the “role 
played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and 
viewpoints”); see also LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 14 (2d ed. 1999); 
John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT ix, xiii–xv (Brian 
O’Connell ed. 1983); Elizabeth T. Boris & Matthew Maronick, Civic Participation and Advocacy, in 
THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 394 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2nd ed. 2012). 
267 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Gerald E. Bevan trans., Peguin Books 2003). 
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There are scholars who generally support a vibrant voluntary 
nonprofit sector.  Some, like Theda Scokpol, believe that nonprofits of a 
voluntary membership nature serve an important democratic-enhancing 
role.268  Her work documents that through the 1950s, the U.S. was 
supported by cross-class voluntary associations that tended to make the 
U.S. a more democratic nation.269  However, since the 1960s, these cross-
class voluntary associations have greatly diminished in favor of 
professionally-run associations supported by the money of elites and 
private foundations.270  This has resulted in a crowding out of the issues of 
middle class and poor citizens, she suggests.271 Her work might also 
support policy directed towards the government providing an 
enhancement towards nonprofit organizations. 
I have argued in the past that to determine whether a nonprofit 
should be exempt from the corporate income tax, we need a theory for 
why we would apply the income tax to a nonprofit corporation in the first 
place.272  In order to find that there is any subsidy to the nonprofit, we 
must believe that a tax should apply to the entity.  There are only two 
likely theories to support the taxation of nonprofits: (1) the shareholder 
theory, and (2) the real entity/regulatory theory.  Neither theory provides 
significant support for taxing charitable organizations as currently 
constructed.  However, both theories generally support applying a tax to 
mutual benefit organizations.  In terms of other tax exempt interest 
groups, I previously argued that trade associations do not suffer 
substantial market failure, and are therefore undeserving of a subsidy.273  
In that article, I left open the possibility that labor unions might be 
deserving of the subsidy.  In the next part, I turn to analyze that matter. 
VI. ANALYSIS: LABOR UNION TAX TREATMENT ASSESSED UNDER A POLITICAL 
FAIRNESS MODEL 
In addition to economic fairness and efficiency, we should consider 
the value of democracy and, particularly, political voice equality in 
assessing our income tax policy.  Generally, political fairness should only 
be one of many factors that should be considered in an evaluation of tax 
policy.  On most matters of the definition of income, for instance, political 
 
268 Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American 
Civic Life 12 (2003). 
269 THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY (2003). 
270 DIMINISHED, at Chapter 6. 
271 DIMINISHED, at 238–39. 
272 Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX 
L. REV. 115, 187–88 (2013). 
273 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16,  at 267. 
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voice equality should likely play a very limited role.  It should play a 
greater role in a consideration of how much progressivity to adopt, as well 
as the proper rate of tax.  However, where tax policy directly impacts 
political voice equality, it should be a major factor in the assessment.  The 
principle of intrinsic equality should not be overridden by principles of 
economic fairness or economic efficiency in these circumstances.  
Furthermore, we should consider ending any tax policy that directly 
exacerbates political voice inequality. 
By “directly impacts political voice equality,” I mean a tax policy that 
immediately applies to an organization’s or an individual’s expression of 
political voice in our democracy.  Thus, on one hand, the deduction of 
payments or receipts to or from political groups, or the taxation of the 
income of political groups, directly impacts political voice equality.  
Partnership taxation, on the other hand, would generally not directly 
impact political voice equality. 
The taxation of interest group activity directly impacts political voice.  
Whether you look at the taxation of an individual’s payments or receipts 
to or from an interest group, or the taxation of the interest group itself, 
the choice will either encourage or discourage the activity of exercising 
political voice.  Thus, on the issue of tax exemption for nonprofits 
generally, and taxation impacting labor unions specifically, I believe we 
should consider the important value of political voice equality. 
In assessing the deductibility of labor union dues and the propriety of 
labor union tax exemption, there are two primary questions—one 
descriptive and one normative: (1) does income tax policy incentivize the 
formation and maintenance of labor unions, and (2) should tax policy 
incentivize the formation and maintenance of labor unions? The second 
question can be broken into three branches: (a) in isolation, should we 
incentivize labor unions; (b) if all other political interest groups are 
similarly incentivized, should labor unions receive that incentive also; and, 
finally, (c) should we incentivize some interests more than others? 
On the first question, as I discuss more below, we likely penalize the 
formation and maintenance of labor unions.  As to the second question, 
tax policy should at least be neutral as to the matter of interest groups, 
and could be structured to provide additional incentives to labor unions.  
This means that if all other groups are provided exemption for the 
organization and deduction for dues payments, labor unions and their 
members should be extended the same treatment.  However, political 
fairness would be enhanced by eliminating tax exemption for all interest 
groups and extending the deductibility of dues above the line to labor 
union members.  Finally, although there are problems with the final case, 
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we could justify eliminating tax exemption for business interests while 
extending it to labor interests.274 
A. Does Income Tax Policy Incentivize Labor Union Activity? 
Tax exemption for labor unions and the deductibility of labor union 
dues appear to be the only two tax policies that might directly impact 
labor interests in formation and maintenance.  As developed in Part I, it 
appears that tax exemption provides a modest subsidy, but that the 
deduction of union dues leads to something of a penalty to the payment 
of union dues. 
The government provides a small subsidy to labor unions through tax 
exemption based primarily on deferral of amounts that would be 
deductible in a future year.275  Although small, this subsidy is likely 
enhanced by other state and local tax benefits like property tax exemption 
that often flow from obtaining tax exempt status.276  Still, the benefit 
appears to be available only sporadically to the most successful labor 
unions.  I say “sporadically” because unions likely rarely experience 
profits; it is likely that only larger unions are either able to sell products 
like insurance to its members and nonmembers to generate profits, or are 
able to actually earn investment income.  As tax exemption is constructed, 
the subsidy is unlikely to ever reach those interests that face the most 
severe collective action challenges because they never organize. 
As for the deductibility of union dues, we penalize the payment of 
union dues rather than subsidize it.  The normal income tax policy 
provides that the association dues one pays for one’s job are deductible 
from income.  Union dues are technically deductible under the Code as a 
business expense.277  However, our income tax treats union dues 
payments to the worst possible treatment, a miscellaneous itemized 
deduction.278  This means that the union member is only able to deduct 
union dues to the extent he has already paid other miscellaneous itemized 
deductions that exceed two percent of his adjusted gross income.  Given 
that in a normal income tax we would allow the deduction of union dues, 
to primarily deny the deduction is in effect to penalize the activity.  In 
 
274 I do not address here how to think about interest groups that are social welfare 
organizations or charitable organizations. The political fairness analysis constructed here based 
on collective action challenges is not as immediately applicable to an organization that is 
generally bankrolled by some wealthy individual. I hope to turn to this challenge in a later paper. 
275 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2014). 
276 Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U. 
S.F. L. REV. 85, 104–05 (1993–1994). 
277 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2014). 
278 26 U.S.C. § 67; 26 U.S.C. § 1.67-1T(a)(1)(i). 
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fairness, Congress adopted a generous standard deduction to eliminate 
the need of people to deduct many expenses such as union dues.279  
However, the fact that union dues are considered a miscellaneous 
itemized deduction further penalizes the activity.  Nevertheless, the result 
of this policy is that we do not incentivize the payment of union dues, and 
could be thought to penalize the payment of union dues.  Admittedly, this 
is a problem of unreimbursed employee business expenses, a policy 
Congress adopted likely to stop employees from trying to take unjustified 
expenses, but union dues would seem to be well outside the type of 
payment that might be abused. 
The severe limitation on the deduction of union dues may very well 
cancel out any subsidy given to labor unions through tax exemption.  A 
laborer would be better off paying a mortgage and property taxes on his 
house or making a charitable contribution280 than paying union dues.  This 
means that rather than subsidizing the formation of labor unions, we 
discourage the joining of labor unions and maintaining union membership. 
The comparison of the labor interest tax treatment to the business 
interest tax treatment is instructive too.  A businessman who wants to join 
a trade association will often be able to deduct the trade association 
amount above the line, thus guaranteeing the deduction in a large 
percentage of circumstances.281  Thus, we generally encourage the joining 
of business interest groups. 
This comparison point is important in the tax exemption sense as 
well.  We provide business interests the same tax exemption opportunity 
we provide to labor interests.  Because the models of business interests 
can differ greatly from the labor interest, it is likely that business interests 
can make much better use of the tax exemption per capita.  Unions 
primarily generate money from member dues.  Those dues are not going 
to differ wildly in amount.  Business interests though often charge sliding 
scale fees that allow them to generate particularly big contributions from 
wealthy members.  Additionally, they can sell various products such as 
industry codes that allow them significant opportunities for profit.  The 
American Medical Association for instance controls and sells the very 
 
279 John R. Brooks, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the Conflict Between 
Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 203, 205 (2011). 
280 26 U.S.C. § 67 treats interest deductions and charitable contribution deductions as 
itemized deductions, rather than miscellaneous itemized deductions. 
281 With many business interests being either entities or employers or small businessmen 
their right to deduct is found in 26 U.S.C. § 62, meaning they are ensured the deduction from 
gross income. 
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profitable codes for medical billing associated with Medicare.282  This 
means business interest’s members are not penalized for making 
contributions to a trade association, and that business interests 
themselves are likely able to generate a larger more regular benefit from 
tax exemption.  Thus, we incentivize business interests to form interest 
groups more than we do labor interests. 
B. Should Tax Policy Incentivize Labor Union Activity? 
That brings us to the second question.  Should we use income tax 
policy to incentivize the formation and maintenance of labor unions? This 
question has three subquestions: (i) in isolation, should we incentivize 
labor unions, (ii) if we are incentivizing other interest groups, should we 
incentivize labor interests too, and (iii) would we be better off with a 
neutral system where all interest groups face the same level of taxation or 
should, and can, we build a system where some interests are incentivized 
over others?  In each instance, tax exemption is considered first, and then 
the case of the deductibility of union dues. 
1. Labor Union Incentives in Isolation 
Labor union revenue appears to bear all the characteristics of taxable 
income.  A union is a separately recognized, independent entity that 
carries on an activity that would be taxed like any other business.  While 
some have argued that charitable organizations do not earn income in the 
sense we think of income within the income tax,283 no one makes that 
claim as to a labor union.  Thus, in absence of some good rationale, labor 
union income should generally be taxed.  None of the current theories of 
tax exemption provide a strong case to support tax exemption for labor 
unions, or labor interests generally. 
We could approach the question of whether a labor union deserves 
income tax exemption from an economic efficiency perspective.  The best 
support for such a case in nonprofit tax exemption rationales is likely 
Hansmann’s contract failure theory based in an economic efficiency 
rationale.  Labor interests face a contract failure because of the collective 
action problem common to large groups where the return from joining is 
relatively small compared to the cost of joining.  Additionally, labor unions 
are created in the nonprofit form such that they undergo some capital 
constraints.  However, along with the fact that Hansmann’s theory 
 
282 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 321 (discussing the AMA’s sale of Current 
Procedural Technology code (CPT Code) that determines how any medical procedure is 
reimbursed by Medicare). 
283 See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 23, at 307–14, 333. 
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provides no real limiting principle,284 many explicitly make the case that 
labor unions are harmful in an economic efficiency sense.285  We could get 
into a battle over the economic efficiency impact of labor unions, but I 
believe there is a more satisfying rationale, if we consider the political 
fairness of the matter. 
Weisbrod’s government failure theory has some promise too.  
Perhaps labor union services are services that the government does not 
provide, but are something a group of our society who are not a majority 
desires.  This is not a perfect fit either.  Labor unions are not an end good 
that might be provided by government, but more of a government process 
in and of itself.  Even if we could find that labor unions provide a good that 
the government fails to provide, this theory offers no reason for why we 
should believe this good should be supported by government.  Again, 
considering the situation from the political fairness angle should offer 
some greater support. 
Perhaps we could try to build a case for labor unions based on a quid 
pro quo theory that labor unions provide some concrete economic 
benefits to society.  The difficulty with this path is that there is evidence 
on the outcomes of unions on our society that point in different 
directions.  Some say unions help in growth and in protecting laborers, 
while others find that they harm our economy while protecting only a 
select few laborers. 
Finally, there may be something in the pluralist argument.  Nonprofit 
organizations enhance the number of voices we find in our political 
system, and thereby improve the deliberations of our representative 
bodies by increasing the amount of political voices.  However, the claim of 
pluralism has never been deeply developed. 
The pluralist argument is based on a facile model of group-based 
democracy.286  This vision of pluralism suggests we encourage every 
interest to form to bring all possible voices to the government.  However, 
that case ignores the collective action problem.  Interests face varying 
levels of difficulty in organizing and maintaining status and action.  This 
means the provision of a subsidy through exemption will likely never go to 
the groups that arguably need it the most.  The pluralist rationale also 
ignores a lesser but important factor—whether groups represent the 
“true” interests of the group members.  Both theoretical and empirical 
 
284 Cf. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 
2066–67 (2007) (arguing for-profit organizations deserve a subsidy for carrying out charitable 
works just like nonprofit organizations). 
285 See supra note 2. 
286 Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 16, at 270–72. 
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scholarship have shown that it is unlikely that groups fulfill this role in a 
way we might hope.  Those who argue that we should support the entire 
nonprofit sector with tax exemption because it will enhance “pluralism” 
fail to acknowledge these deep imperfections. 
Nevertheless, although the nonprofit pluralists are misguided in part, 
their instincts are right.  Much of our nonprofit sector plays a significant 
role in our democratic structure.  Social welfare organizations, labor 
unions, and business leagues are all arguably primarily involved in shaping 
our democracy as interest groups.287  Because of issues of numerosity, 
individual citizens are rarely able to participate in setting the agenda in 
our democracy of items for final votes.  As discussed above, interest 
groups tend to fill this important democratic role on behalf of citizens.  
Thus, getting policy right regarding these nonprofit organizations might be 
less about economic efficiency, and more about getting democracy right.  I 
argue we should consider a neo-pluralist case for supporting interest 
groups through tax exemption. 
A major assumption of this case is that we should strive for 
democracy rather than anarchy or guardianship.  While this assumption 
may seem self-evident, it is anything but.  Founding fathers, such as 
Madison and Hamilton, were deeply drawn to some form of guardianship 
as the best form of government.  The Founders were particularly fearful of 
the laborers and farmers exercising majoritarian power, and tried to 
design our system of representation to ensure mostly only “qualified 
individuals” represented our people.  This is ultimately what Federalist 10 
is about.  Many continue to distrust the poor and working class to 
participate in governing our democracy.  This is seen in efforts to limit 
voting rights to arguments that voters are not educated well enough to 
vote.  Additionally, while we may not think of the U.S. as a strong bastion 
of anarchism, there is a strong libertarian streak in this country that 
argues for as limited a government as possible.  That libertarian streak is 
well expressed in those who would like to see the market control most 
matters of distribution of goods and services.  If you support either of 
these cases, you are unlikely to agree with my case. 
However, if you believe in the principle of intrinsic equality discussed 
in Part II—that most adults have more right to govern themselves than 
anyone else—then you should also generally believe in the case for 
democracy.  Accepting the principle of intrinsic equality comes with a 
corollary that each of us should have a right to participate in the 
governance of our group affairs.  Such a belief could lead to the idealistic 
 
287 Charitable organizations do too, but do not typically do so in a primary sense. 
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notion of pure democracy.  Under that system, to be true to the principle 
of intrinsic equality we would need to ensure that everyone impacted by a 
group decision had the right to help set the agenda of the group, receive 
information about the issues before the group, help to provide 
information about the decisions before the group, and have a right to vote 
on all final decisions.  Obviously, as discussed in Parts II and III, we know 
the world has never seen a pure democracy, and there are reasons to 
believe it is unrealistic. 
Still, not all is lost for democracy.  As discussed in Part III, our notion 
of a democracy is generally a polyarchy where certain critical rights such 
as freedom of speech, association, and the right to regular free and fair 
elections have become what we expect from democracy.  Factors such as 
size of the country or population, and differences in wealth or ability, all 
create significant obstacles to pure democracy, but also to a polyarchy.  
Ensuring equal political voice becomes almost an impossibility under these 
circumstances.  But this does not mean we should not strive for more 
political voice equality in our democracy. 
While groups are far from the perfect answer to this inequality, it 
seems at least that they are a part of a solution.  For many people, groups 
provide their only real opportunity to have a seat at the agenda setting 
table. And, the evidence is strong that labor interests are significantly 
underrepresented.288  Laborers mostly do not have a seat at the agend 
setting table. Blue-collar workers and the poor are thoroughly outgunned 
in the interest group sector by the interests of executives and 
management and business generally.289  As demonstrated in Part III A, this 
is true whether we look at interest group numbers, congressional hearing 
testimony, or money spent on lobbying.   
Whether this representation identifies a disparity in result, is beside 
the point.  The political fairness model I propose focuses on maximizing a 
social choice function, rather than a social welfare function.  In a 
democracy, we should strive to ensure actual representation at the table 
of government. Labor is not at the table.  Under these circumstances, it is 
reasonable and just to ensure that our tax system is not operated in a way 
to hinder the formation of labor interests.  Given the enormous disparity 
in representation, it also seems reasonable and just to try to subsidize 
such interests through the tax system.   
Following this idea to its logical extreme might be unworkable 
though. To push the idea further, where a distinct political interest faces 
 
288 See supra Part III. 
289 See supra Part III.B. 
HACKNEY PROP UP HEAVENLY DRAFT 11917  11/9/2017  5:46 PM 
154 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:nn   
substantial collective action problems, we could strive to aid those 
interests to organize and maintain interest groups based on some sliding 
scale of collective action difficulty.  The principle though is neither 
practical nor administrable.  It suggests that Congress or an agency should 
assess the relative collective action challenge an interest faces before 
providing a subsidy.  Depending on the size of the group, the education of 
interested parties, and the capital resources available, we might ratchet 
up and down some scale that the subsidy provided.  We could even 
conceivably impose a tax on the activity of interests that face no collective 
action problem to hinder particularly powerful interests. 
Adopting such a detailed system is likely to be less than optimal when 
administrability, complexity, and political matters are considered.  In 
assessing an optimal commodity taxation system where tax rose and fell 
based on the relative elasticity of goods, Professor Eric Zolt concluded that 
such a system would have too many informational demands, too much 
added complexity, and likely political problems.290  A subsidy based on the 
relative collective action problem of interests would face similar problems.  
Given these constraints, if we wanted to build such a system, we are 
probably better off making calls based on rough justice regarding broad 
categories of groups, as Congress has in effect already done. 
If we look at labor union tax exemption in isolation, under a rough 
justice, neo-pluralist view, the case for tax exemption for unions seems at 
first glance, strong.  Given that labor interests suffer a significant collective 
action problem and are poorly represented in the interest group eco-
system, there would seem to be good reason to try to enhance their 
ability to organize and maintain a union.  However, if we are in fact 
looking at labor interests in isolation, that is, not taking into consideration 
other interests such as business interests, we might find a more troubling 
picture.  The subsidy of tax exemption is not targeted towards the 
interests that need it the most.  We would assist from year-to-year a very 
narrow sector of the labor market.  Even with the exemption, unions will 
likely be a highly selective group of employees that happen to be in 
sectors of the economy or country that are more conducive to unions than 
others.  While it may help some inchoate unions to organize and then 
maintain status, it probably works to provide greater aid to those 
organizations that were more likely to organize in the first place anyway.  
Thus, standing in isolation without considering the role of other groups in 
our democracy and the incentives provided to them, it is hard to say one 
way or the other whether a subsidy should be provided to labor unions 
 
290 Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 66–67 (1996). 
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alone. I return to this question again in the final part of the analysis in 
considering whether we should provide the subsidy to labor when we take 
the subsidy away from buiness interests. 
What about the case for allowing the deductibility of union dues? 
Because the basic income tax case for deductibility of union dues is so 
strong, it’s hard to imagine another justification.  However, given that 
union dues relate directly to political voice equality denying the deduction 
should be expected to cause significant political unfairness. That 
inequality deepens when we recognize that laborers face significant 
collective action problems in organizing to protect their interests.  The 
neo-pluralist case, thus, strongly backs up the case to provide a deduction 
for this expenditure.  Perhaps, the ability to deduct does not give a tax 
benefit to all who we might like; however, it would seem odd to deny such 
a group of people this deduction. 
2. Exemption to Unions When Other Interests Are Extended Exemption 
In a world where other interests are subsidized through tax 
exemption—this describes current tax policy—the case for providing a 
similar tax exemption to labor interests becomes strong.  For instance, it 
would be highly questionable to provide tax exemption to business and 
not to labor.  Because business interests are generally able to overcome 
the collective action problem with greater ease and have an 
overwhelming superiority in political representation in fact, a subsidy 
available to business and not labor would appear deeply unjust from a 
political fairness perspective.  It would exacerbate political voice 
inequality.  Thus, where business interests are provided tax exemption, 
we must provide the same right to labor. 
Again, as in the prior case, it is hard to imagine an argument 
prohibiting the deduction of labor union dues.  Where other interests may 
deduct such amounts, the case for allowing the deduction of labor union 
dues would seem inescapable.  Doing otherwise would seem to be 
democratically suspect. 
If you conclude that the logic of the above two paragraphs holds, 
then you might also conclude that the system as structured remains 
unjust; because of greater wealth and greater ability to organize, business 
interests can use the tax exemption subsidy to a much greater extent than 
labor.291  Such an unequal subsidy for political representation seems 
 
291 Obviously comparing only labor against business interests is a simplistic analysis. We 
would need to throw in all sorts of other issues in order to have a full sense of justice. However, 
the choices made in the Code are almost always some sort of rough justice, and comparing labor 
to business provides us a simplistic way at getting to this rough justice. 
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antithetical to a balanced democracy.  Additionally, when the limited 
deductability of union dues is considered in light of the fact that business 
interests are able to deduct their comparable payments to trade 
associations, current tax policy seems problematic.   
Thus, if other interests receive tax exemption and deductibility of 
interest group dues, labor unions should receive the same treatment. This 
case may even provide a justification for prohibiting the deduction of 
business interest dues, along with any other interest that does not 
experience significant collective action challenges.  We already deny the 
deduction of political contributions and explicit lobbying payments.292  In a 
sense, a denial of business interest group dues could be an extension of 
that policy. Notably, a contribution to an interest group formed as a tax-
exempt social welfare organization is generally non-deductible as well. 
Business interests seem to be provided a favorable status for some 
reason. 
3. Incentivize Labor Interests While Denying he Incentive to Others 
Where other interests are not subsidized through tax exemption and 
are unable to deduct interest group dues, how should we treat labor 
interests?  To simplify this analysis, I compare only the case of business 
interests and labor interests.  Under this scenario, we could either choose 
to deny tax exemption to labor too, or exempt labor alone.  We are able 
to reasonably consider the taxing labor scenario in full in this simplified 
analysis. That is because it treats everyone the same by imposing the 
same taxing structure on all interest groups and their members and 
potential members. The simplified analysis for incentivizing labor and only 
comparing that to business does not give us a complete picture. I hope in 
a future article to consider more of the interest group sector in both social 
welfare organizations and charitable organizations to more fully consider 
this complex analysis.  Finally, in each case, I assume we are trying to 
increase the social choice function and that we take political fairness in a 
democracy sense into consideration of this tax policy because it directly 
impacts political voice equality. 
If what we want is government neutrality on the matter of tax 
exemption, we should tax labor interests when business interests are 
taxed.  This would mean all income used to support labor and business 
interests, whether those interests are organized or remained unorganized, 
would face the same tax structure choices currently offered by the 
Internal Revenue Code. Such a change would mean either that we treat 
 
292 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(e) (West 2014). 
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such organizations as taxable corporations or treat them as cooperatives 
taxable under Subchapter T.  Those that never organize would simply pay 
taxes on income that they might have put towards organizing.   
The key to this neo-pluralist case is that it would be a positive 
democratic move to treat both interests as taxable rather than tax-
exempt.  On the one hand, the subsidy of tax exemption is given currently 
to business interests even though the vast majority of those interests are 
well-represented and face little in the way of collective action problems. 
They would organize whether there was a subsidy or not. The subsidy to 
them is a windfall and those interests are best placed to capture and use 
the subsidy. Labor, on the other hand, is not well represented in a political 
voice sense, and is little able to make use of the subsidy even when 
available.  Taxing both interests would place both interests in the same 
relative position.  
If we implemented such a change, labor unions would likely pay little 
to no tax because it likely has little to no earnings.  Business interests 
would likely pay some tax associated with their activities.  Treating 
business and labor interests alike in this way would be to treat the two in 
a tax neutral matter.   
The neutral policy on dues would likely be to deny the dues 
deduction to labor interests when business interests are denied the 
deduction. Anyone engaging in interest group activity would bear tax on 
their individual or entity level tax they otherwise would owe. As it stands, 
the current policy primarily supports the interest of businessmen.  As 
noted above, Congress already treats political campaign expenditures and 
lobbying expenditures as non-deductible personal ones. There is no 
reason we could not extend that notion into this very similar realm. Given 
that most laborers are unable to take this deduction anyway, this do little 
to no harm to the labor union movement.  It would also move the 
government to a more neutral stance by not incentivizing the business 
association interests over that of labor as currently happens.  
The more difficult question in a justice sense is whether to  provide 
labor interests tax exemption and allow labor union members the ability 
to deduct union dues while denying the same to business interests.   
Although the subsidy for labor unions through tax exemption is 
neither great in amount nor well-tailored, even marginal improvements in 
the labor interest representation should enhance our democracy because 
it would likely increase the social choice function.  If the modest subsidy 
administered in the absence of a business interest subsidy results in even 
a couple extra unions representing some group of laborers we would likely 
have more individuals with a seat at the table for agenda-setting and 
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decision-making.  Still, denying the deduction to business interests would 
likely lead to fewer business interests obtaining representation as well, 
which would result in some lessening of the social choice function.  How 
do we reconcile that? 
While it seems difficult to compare the results of this change in 
policy, given the relative collective action problems of the two different 
groups, it seems likely that business interests would still be more generally 
represented before federal, state and local governments than labor 
interests even after losing tax exemption.  Studies of the impact of 
removing exemption could be useful.  Nevertheless, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that labor interests are so hampered, while business interests 
are so advantaged in comparison, that it is likely that providing the subsidy 
to labor and not business would be social choice function enhancing.  
Thus, I argue, we could legitimately maintain tax exemption for labor 
interests in this case.  For the reasons set forth though in Part VI B 1 
though, the case is not a strong one.  There are many interests who will 
never obtain the benefit of the subsidy. 
A stronger case can be made for allowing employees to deduct labor 
union dues above the line while simultaneously denying that right to 
business association members.  Allowing a deduction for labor union dues 
would be targeted exactly to encourage membership in a union.  This 
means this deduction would be tailored to the choice of an employee to 
join and stay in a labor union.  Providing this subsidy while denying it to 
business interests could again increase the social choice function, 
although still with the caveats listed above.   Still, providing the deduction 
to labor would not reach the interests that never organize and this creates 
its own political voice equality problems.  
If someone were still inclined to try to utilize the exemption and the 
deduction to enhance the social choice function, there is still one other 
area to at least consider. Can we constitutionally limit—or equalize—
interest group expenditures through the tax system to limit the power of 
wealthy voices—or equalize the voices of everyone else?293  As noted in 
Part III, while the fundamental rights (freedom of speech, free and fair 
elections) of a polyarchy are there to make political voice equality 
possible, they do not work to make it a reality.  While our Constitution 
promises one person, one vote, and ensures freedom of speech and 
association, it does not explicitly speak to establishing a system to provide 
political voice equality.  This is the debate we see in campaign finance.  
 
293 RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED 74–89 (2016); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST 58–70 
(2016) (considering this question with respect to campaign contributions within campaign 
finance law). 
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Those who advocate for campaign finance regulations often point out the 
harmful effect of wealth on our democracy because it makes wealthy 
individuals’ voices so much more powerful than every day Americans.  
With that said, the Supreme Court does not recognize equality as a 
rationale for imposing campaign finance limitations.294 
In Buckley v. Valeo the Court stated: 
[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed to secure 
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.295 
Whether this opinion and its progeny puts a roadblock on how the 
tax system is used to subsidize certain interests is an important question 
that needs examination.  I provide here only my initial thoughts. 
The lesson of collective action theory and the empirical work on 
interest group structure is that not all interests are created equally.  
Neutrality as to these matters means that some interests will necessarily 
have a much louder voice at the table of government than others.  Many 
will have no voice at all.  The attitude of the Buckley Court on the First 
Amendment may very well be the intent of the Framers, but it fails 
miserably as a matter of achieving a stronger democracy and justice.296  
How does this opinion impact deductions and exemptions from tax? 
The Court’s use of the limits on equality principle as a justification 
seem to be focused on provisions that either limit campaign expenditures 
or limit campaign contributions.  Providing a deduction or not, and 
providing tax exemption or not, has not been seen by the Court as the 
type of limitation that campaign finance applies.  In Cammarano v. United 
States, the Court found that denying a deduction for lobbying expenses 
harmed no First Amendment interest.297  Furthermore, in examining the 
question of whether a charitable organization could be limited in its ability 
to lobby, the Court in Regan v. Taxation with Representation again found 
no First Amendment interest violated by limiting tax exemption based on 
 
294 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976). 
295 Id. at 48–49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
296 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 360 (expanded ed. 2005) (“The Court fails to 
recognize the essential point that the fair value of the political liberties is required for a just 
political procedure, and that to insure their fair value it is necessary to prevent those with 
greater property and wealth, and the greater skills of organization which accompany them, from 
controlling the electoral process to their advantage.”). 
297 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512–13 (1959). 
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the activity of lobbying.298  The Court held that there was no equal 
protection issue in subsidizing one interest more than another, such as 
when Congress grants the benefit of accepting tax deductible charitable 
contributions to veterans organizations, but not to social welfare 
organizations.299  Thus, it appears that the Court has thus far willingly 
allowed tax exemption and tax deductions to be established with political 
activity in mind. 
This suggests that if Congress chooses to treat all interests equally, it 
can.  If it wants to subsidize some activity more than another, it can do 
that too.  It seems like the most difficult issue is whether it could subsidize 
some interest greater than another.300  In other words, could it 
legitimately choose to subsidize labor more than business interests, or 
vice versa.  Justice and democracy demand that Congress be allowed to 
give a helping hand to interests that face great challenges in projecting 
their voice in our democracy.  I leave for another time whether the 
Constitution permits that choice. However, Congress has at its disposal 
the ability to make a political voice equality enhancing move by removing 
tax exemption from labor and business and by taxing the dues of both 
labor and interest.  Another possible social choice function enhancing 
move would be to provide labor union members a deduction above the 
line for union dues to equalize the treatment of business and labor 
interests that are now out of balance in favor of business interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the focus of this Article is on one small sector of the tax 
world, laborers as an interest group, it uses that sector to argue we should 
consider political fairness as a factor in tax policy.  It demonstrates that 
current policy on tax exemption likely harms social choice function by 
enhancing the voice of business and diminishing the voice of labor.  
Although traditionally we examine tax policy by considering its economic 
fairness and efficiency, I argue we should consider the value of political 
fairness when a tax policy directly implicates political voice.  In the case of 
labor union activity the tax policy of tax exemption and the deduction of 
union dues directly impact political voice.   
 
298 Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 61 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983). 
299 Id. at 550–51. See also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1064, 1071 (2014) (noting that such a distinction is 
constitutional as long as the government has a rational basis, and further finding this TWR 
distinction limiting speech is also constitutional because there is no lesser means of 
accomplishing the limitation). 
300 Regan v. Taxation With Representation suggests at least that this should pass 
constitutional muster. 61 U.S. 540, 548–49. 
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A fundamental tenet of this political fairness analysis I propose is that 
it focus on a social choice function.  I contend that the social choice 
function is key in this analysis because our tax policy should be democracy 
enhancing rather than democracy detracting.  The primary question to ask 
therefore is whether a particular policy increases political voice equality.  
Current policy on both exemption and the deduction of union dues likely 
decreases political voice equality.  We should therefore look to change tax 
policy towards labor unions. 
This Article presents a neo-pluralist justification for the exemption 
from income tax provided for interest groups.  The original pluralism 
justification suggested we should support any and all nonprofit 
organizations, no matter the cause, in order to enhance our democracy.  
The neo-pluralist justification recognizes the deep impact of the collective 
action problem on the interests in our society.  In particular, those 
interests that are vast in number, poor in wealth, and limited in political 
skill are likely to face great difficulty in organizing to represent their 
interests before our governments.  Conversely, those interests that are 
smaller, wealthy, and endowed with political skill are likely to face little 
difficulty in organizing to represent their interests.  This collective action 
problem is a significant hindrance to advancing democracy.  Interest 
groups are significant representatives of peoples’ interests before our 
government.  We should not adopt policies that make that democratic 
failure worse. 
Currently, the Code appears to treat business and labor interests 
exactly the same under tax-exemption.  Business interests can form 
nonprofit tax-exempt organizations to further their interests, and labor 
interests and the poor can do the same.  However, because of the 
problem of collective action this system overwhelmingly helps out the 
business interests and leaves the interests of the workingman behind.  We 
would enhance political voice equality by ending exemption generally for 
labor unions and trade associations.  Although the case is not strong and is 
subject to problems, we could legitimately choose to maintain it for labor.  
Additionally, current policy that allows business interests to deduct dues, 
but limits labor interests from deducting the same, is unjust and harmful 
to our democracy.  We should either allow labor union members to 
deduct their union dues above the line or prohibit business interests from 
deducting these expenses like we do to most labor union members.   
 
 
